International Twitter Comments About 2016 U.S. Presidential Candidates Trump And Clinton: Agenda-Building Analysis In The U.S., U.K., Brazil, Russia, India and China by O’Boyle, Jane
University of South Carolina
Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2017
International Twitter Comments About 2016 U.S.
Presidential Candidates Trump And Clinton:
Agenda-Building Analysis In The U.S., U.K., Brazil,
Russia, India and China
Jane O’Boyle
University of South Carolina
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Mass Communication Commons
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu.
Recommended Citation
O’Boyle, J.(2017). International Twitter Comments About 2016 U.S. Presidential Candidates Trump And Clinton: Agenda-Building
Analysis In The U.S., U.K., Brazil, Russia, India and China. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/
etd/4401
  
 
 INTERNATIONAL TWITTER COMMENTS ABOUT  
2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES TRUMP AND CLINTON:  
AGENDA-BUILDING ANALYSIS IN THE  
U.S., U.K., BRAZIL, RUSSIA, INDIA AND CHINA 
 
by 
Jane O’Boyle 
Bachelor of Arts 
University of Michigan, 1981 
 
Master of Arts 
College of Charleston, 2013 
 
_____________________________________ 
 
 
Submitted In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
Mass Communications 
College of Information and Communications 
University of South Carolina 
2017 
Accepted by: 
Carol J. Pardun, Major Professor 
Leigh Moscowitz, Committee Member 
Tara Mortensen, Committee Member 
Marc Moskowitz, Committee Member 
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
 
 ii 
 
 
  
   
 
ii 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Jane O’Boyle, 2017 
All Rights Reserved. 
 
 
 iii 
 
 
  
   
 
iii 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
In addition to the aforementioned committee members who have much enhanced my 
knowledge and passion for communications research, I would like to thank my husband, 
Bill Jordan, for his support, and encouragement throughout the process of my education 
and this work. 
 iv 
 
 
  
   
 
iv 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Based on agenda-building theory, this study performs content analysis on 6,019 
international Twitter comments about Trump and Clinton in the 10 days prior to the 2016 
U.S. presidential election. Even excluding bots and trolls, the preponderance of Twitter 
comments were positive about Trump and negative about Clinton, in the U.S., Russia, 
India and China.  In the U.K. and Brazil, Twitter comments were largely negative about 
both candidates. Twitter sources and topics  were also identified and explored to expand 
knowledge about the evolving role and effect of agenda-building in six nations, and 
around the world. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 “A lie will travel around the world while the truth is still pulling on his boots.” 
This adage is attributed to Massachusetts representative Fisher Ames in an 1821 article in 
The North American Review (although some credit Jonathan Swift from 1710: 
“Falsehood flies, and the Truth comes limping after it”).  At the time, of course, it took 
months for news to travel around the world. With digital technology of the 21
st
 century, it 
now takes only a few seconds. A social media comment or video can span time zones and 
borders faster than the speed of light, and with instantaneous effects on millions of 
people, whether they have boots or not.  
Mainstream news that was generated on Twitter was one of the central elements 
of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, and subsequent analysis reveals that many of the 
stories were largely manipulated or totally fabricated (Stone & Gordon, 2017, Howard et 
al., 2017). Republican candidate Donald Trump himself, among others, helped to drive 
the mainstream media agenda with his prolific use of the social media platform, and then 
propagated the notion that much of mainstream media news is “fake” (Lynch, 2016; 
Viner, 2016; Maheshwari, 2016). Media coverage before, during and after the 2016  
election cited previously unexplored conflicts of interest and the increased effects of 
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“citizen journalists” in creating and perpetuating questionable news stories on social 
media (McIntire, 2016; McCoy, 2016). These stories and social media discourses gained 
credibility and traction, and doubtless affected national election results. A number of 
major media stories were generated by comments on Twitter--stories that were blasted on 
the headlines of mainstream media--that later were learned to have come from Russian 
sources or non-credible entrepreneurs in eastern Europe (Dwoskin et al., 2017; McIntire, 
2016). Vonbun, Königslöw, and Schoenbach, (2015) had found that, during elections in 
particular, online media set the agenda for other mainstream media, replacing newspapers 
as the intermedia agenda-setters. One political reporter at The Daily Beast said it was 
vital to her job during the 2016 election: “If I’m not on Twitter for 30 minutes, I miss a 
story” (Manjoo, 2016, n.p.). This merits examination of sources on Twitter about the 
2016 U.S. presidential campaign, exploring their identity and topics, to elicit emerging 
elements and to expand knowledge of this relatively new phenomenon.  
Statement of the Problem 
Journalists and scholars have been quick to undertake examinations and meta-
analyses of the 2016 media coverage in this age of digital news feeds and national 
elections (Howard et al., 2017; Gottfried et al., 2017; Stone & Gordon, 2017; Chou, 
2016; Lynch, 2016; Viner, 2016; Maheshwari, 2016; McIntire, 2016; McCoy, 2016). 
Media producers and writers published debriefing analyses on their election coverage, 
which had been much criticized for focusing on scandals and outrage instead of on policy 
and substantive issues. Recent academic studies have examined the tone and content of 
mainstream media about candidates Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, which was 
predominantly negative all around (Patterson, 2016), even by reporters who traditionally 
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maintain objective tones in their news stories (Farhi, 2016), or whose biases may 
normally be reined in by their editors. “Social media platforms such as Twitter and 
Facebook give scribes a direct and unfiltered publishing platform, enabling them to 
address thousands or even hundreds of thousands of followers without a meddlesome 
editor standing in the way” (Farhi, 2016, n.p.). During the campaign, Twitter comments 
that ranked high in negative tones were more likely to be retweeted than were positive 
comments (Chou, 2016).  
But in the new globalized parameters of media production, a wider lens is needed 
to put such media agendas into context.  While Americans contend with a new president 
who says he hates the media (although he very ably manipulates it) and who sows distrust 
among media consumers, other nations, observing from the outside, bring their own 
cultural identities to such social media discourse and news agendas. Analyses of social 
media content in other nations could reveal commonalities and distinctions of the themes 
and topics during a contentious American election, such as whether one candidate 
received more frequent or more positive coverage than the other, whether any of the 
coverage was differentiated by native political infrastructures (for example, authoritarian 
China may have been more receptive to one candidate than was democratic India), or 
whether social media discourse generated alternative news agendas about the election 
than what was observed in American media.  
A wider study could also update research on agenda-building theory, whose 
studies have a large gap when it comes to journalists’ and media producers’ increasing 
reliance on Twitter for story ideas and sources. Therefore, the goal of this study was to 
examine the Twitter comments about both candidates in the U.S. and in five key nations 
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that are of prime importance to American diplomacy and international trade.  Rather than 
examining candidates’ tweets, this study examined tweets generated by others about the 
candidates. While President Trump has shown to be a prolific user of Twitter, this study 
aimed to identify the other sources who influenced his social media campaign—and 
Clinton’s campaign--in order to assess whose influence emerged most frequently in 
international social media: was it citizen journalists, politicians, special interests, media 
companies, or international hackers? By identifying Twitter sources and tones within 
each country, new factors emerge to help identify trends in  the American social media 
discourse that vary from those in other nations, ones which may have a different effect on 
building international media agendas. This study also generates new knowledge about the 
use of Twitter outside the U.S., in powerful and diverse sections of the world. In addition, 
this study probes the legitimacy and identified specific sources with the greatest reach in 
the Twittersphere, those that are  most followed or retweeted by audiences. 
Recent studies show the emergence of Twitter in setting the agenda for 
mainstream media: “Twitter has become a convenient tool for journalists to interact with 
possible sources and gather information from a vast pool of people without leaving the 
office or even picking up the phone” (Lewis, Zamith & Hermida, 2013, p. 39).  In a 
separate study, these authors also found that non-elite sources had a growing influence 
with journalists through Twitter (Lewis, Zamith & Hermida, 2015). Oxford scholar Philip 
Howard and his colleagues published a study of how Twitter propagated “fake news” in 
U.S. states (2017). However, there remains a gap in the literature regarding how Twitter 
is employed in other nations, and whether the Twitter comments are replicated across 
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borders and across cultures. As such, this study focuses on some of the largest Twitter 
populations for closer examination.  
 
 
Figure 1.1 
 
Number of active Twitter users, in millions. 
Source: 2016, Statista.com: https://www.statista.com/statistics/242606/number-of-active-
twitter-users-in-selected-countries/ 
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Figure 1.2 
 
Countries ranked in order of % of Twitter users in their internet populations. 
Source: Business Insider: http://www.businessinsider.com/the-top-twitter-markets-in-the-
world-2013- 
 
 
Nations selected for this study include India, Brazil and the United Kingdom, due 
to their democratic infrastructures and their history of having elected women as leaders, 
which was a new issue in the 2016 American election campaign. Also, India and Brazil 
are woefully underrepresented in mass communications research, and their inclusion will 
help provide a foundation for growing awareness and knowledge of social media in those 
nations. Also chosen to study was China, due to its important diplomatic and commercial 
ties to the U.S. While China does not allow public access to Twitter, it is common 
practice for Chinese journalists to use Twitter in order to disseminate official news about 
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their nation (Chin & Abkowitz, 2016). This study will expand on knowledge about how 
those state-controlled media use Twitter in regards to news about the United States.  
Finally, Russian entities were found to be the sources of certain media stories that 
favored one American candidate over another, and the election is still being investigated 
by the FBI to see how the Kremlin may have influenced this campaign 
(Nakashima, Demirjian & Barrett, 2017). The Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence published a report in 2017 which concluded, in part: “Putin and the Russian 
Government aspired to help President-elect Trump’s election chances when possible by 
discrediting Secretary Clinton and publicly contrasting her unfavorably to 
him….Moscow’s influence campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends 
cover messaging operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian 
Government agencies, state-funded media, third party intermediaries, and paid social 
media users or ‘trolls’” (2017, p. ii). Some researchers and media companies have 
identified that one such tactic included the use of “bots,” automated social media 
accounts that are programmed to interact with other users under false identities (Timberg, 
2017; Albright, 2016). This study includes Twitter comments from Russia in order to 
identify the types of sources, its leading opinion-makers and to identify if the sources and 
tones were similar to other nations, particularly the United States.  
Not every mainstream story is generated on Twitter, of course. But in this 
political event of 2016, it seemed that many were, more than in the past. The news media 
itself became as much the focus of attention as the elected candidate, Donald Trump. 
Communications scholar Robert Fortner said “all international communication is political 
in one way or another…because they cross the boundaries of nation-states, and because 
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uncontrolled information threatens monopolies of knowledge used as the basis of 
political power” (1993, p. 8). In the age of Twitter, international communication is even 
more politicized. Social media once was hailed as the technological vehicle to spread 
information to the people, to break up monopolies of knowledge. Instead it may prove to 
be the vehicle that effectively spreads uncontrolled misinformation across boundaries in 
the pursuit of political power.   
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative study was to study the comments, topics, tones 
and sources by obtaining statistical results from content analysis of random Twitter 
comments in six nations in the days prior to the election. This study employed literature 
from agenda-building to identify variables and to form the basis for  research questions, 
such as which sources in each nation were most often tweeted and retweeted regarding 
Trump or Clinton, and what were the most common topics of tweets for each candidate in 
each nation (e.g., events, polls, policy stands, subjective attributes, affective attributes).  
Moreover, results may show distinctions of agendas in nations where media are tightly 
controlled by the government, in Russia and China. Women as leaders may also appear in 
media agendas: Brazil and India are two emerging democracies that have elected women 
as leaders, although one of them (Dilma Rousseff of Brazil) was quickly impeached and 
removed from office in 2016 (Romero, 2016). While these countries, as well as the 
United Kingdom, have elected women as leaders, the United States remains one of the 
few democratic world powers that has not elected a woman president, although the 2016 
election came close.  
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This dissertation adds to research on international communication and on agenda-
building, by identifying influential media sources in the U.S. and five other nations, with 
implications for future research on agenda-setting, social media, political and 
international communication and public diplomacy. 
Significance of the Study 
This study expands knowledge about international communications; to date, there 
are few studies that compare the news media of several countries, and none that examine 
the social media news feeds used by multinational journalists and consumers. Golan and 
Himelboim (2016) cited the need for expanded studies into international news media. In 
the age when “fake news” is generated online by teenagers in Macedonia and runs 
rampant across the U.S. (McIntire, 2016), and international diplomacy may be balanced 
on the Twitter feed of the American president himself (Lynch, 2016; Isaac & Ember, 
2016), it is vital to understand the sources and practices employed on Twitter by 
international sources. Most important, this study significantly broadens researchers’ 
knowledge of the evolving nature of agenda-building and intermedia agenda-setting in 
the 21
st
 century. Previous research focused on the theory using print and broadcast news 
media. This study pursues multiple new avenues presented by the speed and scope of 
news on social media, including its effects on mainstream media, from sources within 
and outside the U.S. Furthermore, to date, there is minimal communications research 
about the nations in the scope of this study. Guo and Vargo (2017) suggest “the 
investigation of intermedia agenda setting between news media in different countries can 
greatly enrich our understanding of international news flow and, ultimately, international 
relations” (p. 503). While the literature reveals several studies about China, the U.K. and 
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the United States, virtually no studies exist regarding the international roles of social 
media in Brazil, India and Russia.  Because of the scope and the subjects, findings in this 
study fill gaps in knowledge about political communication, public diplomacy and 
international relations, as well as expand communications scholarship in a redefining era 
for agenda-building and social media. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
This study is rooted in agenda-building theory, which evolved from McCombs’s 
and Shaw’s original 1972 agenda-setting research. Their study of the 1968 U.S. 
presidential election revealed that the topics named by American voters as having 
greatest importance were the same ones that were most covered by the news media: there 
was a correlation between news media content and public opinion. Cobb and Elder 
(1972) observed that when groups or organizations desired the attention of policy makers, 
they used the media to highlight their issues, particularly as sources for news reporters. 
McCombs and Shaw had studied the news media agenda effects on the public and policy 
making; Cobb and Elder examined the effects of sources on news media producers.  
Agenda-building is the appropriate theory for this research because one of this study’s 
goals was to identify Twitter sources and topics that influence other media producers on 
the topic of the presidential election. 
Herbert Gans is a sociologist who focused on who, or which special interests, 
were feeding the media with stories, declaring that sources “do the leading in the tango” 
of journalists and their sources (1979, p. 116), meaning that journalists largely use 
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exactly what sources provide, in the ways the sources intend. In the age of Twitter, an 
overwhelming barrage of source material is delivered to journalists by the minute, to 
journalists who must produce streaming news content more quickly than ever before. The 
time has come to examine more thoroughly the content of Twitter due to its influence in 
building a global media agenda. 
 Past studies about agenda-building also have focused on public relations sources, 
on lobbying organizations as well as on politicians (e.g., Tuchman, 1978; Manning, 
2001). For example, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) outlined what they perceived as a five-
level model of influences in building a media agenda. These “hierarchies of influence” 
include the journalist’s own knowledge, background, interests and innate or overt biases, 
the routines of the practice (including use of public relations contacts, political sources, 
and important friends), policies of the media organization, and social institutions and 
social systems. Twitter and other social media have entered the realm of each of these 
levels. 
Cobb and Elder (1972) and Dearing and Rogers (1996) defined agenda building 
as the ways in which issues are created and how they command or fail to command the 
attention of decision makers, almost as an alternative to democracy wherein more of the 
population is able to participate in policy discussions in the media. Lang and Lang (1981; 
1983) described a reciprocal loop that builds the media agenda – from the original story 
and its frames, to audience interpretation and then back to the agenda-building 
journalists. For the current study, the reciprocal loop would be the media producers and 
feedback on Twitter. Some agendas are determined by political-cultural values through 
which the importance is judged by virtue of their proximity to consensus (Shoemaker & 
 13 
 
 
  
   
 
13 
 
 
Reese, 1991). In the case of Twitter, messages are more accessible than ever for global 
populations, and the scale and parameters of “consensus” may be changing as a result. 
McCombs, Shaw and Weaver (1997) elaborated on intermedia agenda-setting, finding 
that people now shop for the agendas that mirror their own views.  
Intermedia Agenda-Setting 
Many scholars have written about intermedia agenda-setting (e.g. Vonbun et al, 
2015; Brandenburg, 2002), which is when a story from one news outlet carries over to a 
different kind of news outlet. Studies have shown, for example, that elite newspapers 
(e.g. The New York Times) produce stories that were later covered by national television 
news programs (e.g., The NBC Nightly News).  Grusczynski and Wagner (2016) 
identified a newer phenomenon called agenda-uptake, which is the media’s new abilities 
to react quickly to information-seeking behavior: “Agenda-setting endures in a 
fragmented era, but it is ensconced in a larger set of dynamic, sometimes fleeting, 
relationships between the agendas of the mainstream media, new media, and public, with 
effects that reflect the oft-fleeting nature of the modern news cycle. Agenda-uptake 
applies and expands on..intermedia agenda-setting…and articulates the dynamic 
relationships between the agendas of different types of news media” (p. 20). This study 
explores the dynamic relationships in the age of Twitter news feeds and how they affect 
the fleeting news cycles around the world. 
Before Twitter, a media source was rarely an everyday citizen—or someone 
posing, unverified, as a journalist--which is why there needs to be more research on 
agenda-building in the age of social media. Studies are emerging about Twitter users, 
such as Segesten and Bossetta (2017) who examined the 2015 British elections. Their 
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study found that U.K. citizens used Twitter as a tool for mobilizing action, more than the 
political parties did, but they did not examine the citizens’ role in propagating online 
news stories. Twitter enables anyone, anywhere, to quickly take off as an internationally 
acclaimed source, with or without media credentials.  The lines between professional 
journalist, engaged citizen and online prankster are difficult to discern on the internet, 
especially across international datelines. In addition, Shoemaker and Reese (1991) 
concluded that the agenda-building process has an important fifth step, which is “cultural 
considerations.” If it is an American news outlet, for example, the journalist will put a 
story into context that will be appreciated and understood by the ones who will consume 
it in America. A news outlet in another culture may present a story in a way that makes 
sense to that international setting: change the tone, exclude certain details, and so forth. 
But the cultural context may be misconstrued by other nationalities, all of whom are still 
learning to negotiate credibility and effective news on Twitter. 
This researcher performed a study in 2016 which examined how often the Twitter feed 
from television talk show host Ellen DeGeneres was picked up by news media in other 
formats. It was found that, in one year, television news shows at ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN 
and Fox  broadcast 251 Twitter comments from “The Ellen Show,” which included clips 
from her TV program. In addition, local TV and radio news websites used DeGeneres’ 
Twitter feed 1,291 times in that year (O’Boyle, 2016). Other research has found that 
emerging media (such as political blogs and partisan news websites) are now more likely 
to set the agenda than traditional news outlets (Meraz, 2011; Vargo & Guo, 2016). 
Mainstream news media are picking up on stories from entertainment media and partisan 
websites, and content analysis of other Twitter data may reveal how much some of them 
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are relying on content from individual consumers for news stories. Twitter encompasses a 
sort of conflation of intermedia agenda-setting and agenda-building, which is another 
reason it merits further study. McCombs, Lopez-Escobar and Llamas (2000) clarified 
attribute agenda-building, which they called second-level agenda-building. By then, 
agenda-setting already had been separated into two levels, including attribute salience. 
McCombs, Lopez-Escobar et al. (2000) revealed that such attribute salience was part of 
agenda-building as well. Their research concluded that agenda-building went beyond 
mere object salience transfer (or first-level agenda-building) and also introduced attribute 
salience to journalists (second-level agenda-building). This attribute salience may be 
subjective (focusing a news story on issues, a politician’s integrity or personal history), or 
this attribute salience may be affective (inserting a positive or negative valence or tone 
into story details). The authors describe how attribute salience influences object salience 
in agenda-building, and this has been confirmed in a number of more recent studies. For 
example, Kiousis et al. (2006, 2009) found that attribute salience made a difference in the 
media agenda during statewide elections in the U.S. Positive and negative tones often 
exist in news sources, whether the journalist acknowledges them or not. Agenda-building 
of attributes starts with where a journalist obtained the information, and that place is 
more and more often on Twitter. Who is using Twitter? What are Twitter comments 
saying or showing in pictures? How popular are the comments and commentators (i.e., 
how much are they “retweeted)?” How much of Twitter is reaching and being recycled 
by mainstream media on Twitter?” Denham (2010) argues that agenda-building is a 
constant negotiation between sources, and more studies are needed. 
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Barack Obama was the first U.S. presidential candidate who relied on Twitter to 
maximize his campaign exposure and platform, in 2008 and 2012 (Kiousis et al., 2015). 
In 2016, the landscape shifted to emphasize social media—and particularly Twitter—
more than any presidential campaign in history. Twitter entered a new stage of influence 
on mainstream media, not only by its use and participation by the candidates themselves, 
but by others who manipulated all the media channels, who generated messages that 
mainstream outlets were using “fake news” and unidentified sources which, in many 
instances, they were themselves. Candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump are 
strong topics to measure as they were well-covered by media in multiple countries, 
allowing for a compare and contrast of Twitter sources and content on an international 
scale. Other researchers may examine the texts from the candidates themselves, but this 
study focuses on the messages and influence of others, and how they varied from one part 
of the world to the next. 
Agenda-building and International Media 
When it comes to agenda-building in international relations, some agendas are 
created by the cultural and political distance between nations as reflected in the media’s 
organizational needs and values—i.e., trying to gain readers through engaging and 
entertaining stories (Gitlin, 1980; Chang, 1998; Entman, 2008). The success of media 
stories often relies on story relevance, audiences, and political and communication skills  
(Bennet, 1990; Entman, 1993; Pan & Kosicki, 2003; Sheafer, 2001). Sheafer and Gabay 
(2009) found that the success of one country in promoting its agenda in foreign media “is 
a function of the cultural and political congruency between itself and the target country” 
(p. 463). They found a high correlation between the U.S. government agenda and the U.S. 
 17 
 
 
  
   
 
17 
 
 
media, as well as the U.K. government and the U.K. media (Sheafer & Gabay, 2009), 
indicating there is significant influence from individual governments over their own 
media. “The more the initiated event correlates with news media values (e.g., dramatic, 
emotional, and negative events) the more the initiator succeeds in promoting its agenda” 
(p. 463).  In addition, “news media do tell people what to think by providing the public 
with an agenda of attributes—a list of characteristics of important newsmakers” (Wanta, 
Golan & Lee, 2004, p. 364.); Wanta, Golan and Lee (2004) found news coverage about 
another country has direct influence on U.S. public opinion of that country, and also that 
news about many nations, such as India, was virtually non-existent in the U.S. for many 
years.  
Wanta and Hu (1994) found that agenda-building is comprised of the choices 
made by journalists to cover some issues over others, and they studied how these choices 
were shaped by outside forces, such as politicians and corporations and, now, by Twitter 
conversations (Parmelee, 2014). International news exposure was found to be 
significantly related to positive feelings about a target nation (Salwen & Matera, 1992). 
Ramanathan (2016) identified a “vulture mentality” in international news media when 
reporting on crises in developing countries, but found that international media were less 
biased when reporting about a country not their own. Guo and Vargo (2017) found that 
online news sources covered wealthier nations more frequently than less economically 
powerful ones. This study examines how Twitter plays a role in various international 
media settings. Media discourse is determined by the dominant culture and therefore 
“presents the news within a framework of certain values” (Kennedy & Hills, 2009, p. 75), 
so it is important to interpret the meaning of the journalists’ choice of sources between 
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nations. For example, there have been legislative and judicial demands to investigate the 
role of Russia’s intervention in the 2016 U.S. presidential election. One popular Twitter 
account called Patriot News was operated out of Great Britain by an avowed proponent of 
Russia President Vladimir Putin, and declared its mission was to spread “devastating 
anti-Clinton, pro-Trump memes and sound bites” (McIntire, 2016, n.p.). Another Twitter 
source called “Just Trump It” also was operating out of Russia, according to the Atlantic 
Council Institute (McIntire, 2016, n.p.). This study examines the tones and sources of 
Twitter messages about both American candidates from Russia, and from other nations, 
providing formative research that may or may never emerge from investigative 
committees or federal agencies. Certainly, in 2016, the Twitter stories about the 
presidential campaign were dramatic, emotional and negative. This study examines how 
these attributes varied from one nation to the next, and whether messages may have 
crossed borders because they were more dramatic and emotional. 
Second-level agenda-building examines the salience of affective attributes such as 
positive, negative and neutral tones, story frames that can influence public opinion. Many 
scholars have found that this type of agenda-building often makes its way into the media 
agenda, such as Kiousis and Wu (2008) who found that the efforts of public relations 
counsel was associated with a decrease of negative news coverage regarding affective 
attributes about a foreign nation. This second level is explored in this study as well, and 
reveals sources who influenced negative media coverage about the U.S. in other nations. 
Golan and Himelboim (2016) noted how social media provide world governments with a 
platform to disseminate news directly to the public. They used World System theory to 
study how this has undermined the traditional one-way flow in Russia, China, and the 
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Middle East, and how non-institutional sources on social media bridged news sources and 
audiences in a way that was once the sole purview of elite news sources. This study 
explores sources and content from multiple countries to expand on such knowledge. For 
example, it is acknowledged that Chinese government authorities block Twitter from its 
citizens, but they permit journalists to use the feed in order to specifically disseminate 
positive images and stories to overseas media (Chin & Abkowitz, 2016). As such, the 
tones and topics of Twitter comments about the U.S. election from China will serve as an 
insightful lens into the goals of its government regarding the leadership of its rival world 
power.  
Agenda-Building on Social Media 
Like Facebook, Twitter was created in the late 2000s and took off around the 
globe after the introduction of the smartphone in 2007. Scholars are still catching up with 
Twitter studies, many of which focus on adoption, technology, and some about politics 
and social movements (e.g., Fahmy et al., 2012, on the Egyptian uprising), and qualitative 
studies on how journalists use Twitter as a news source (Parmelee, 2013; 2014).  Some 
scholars have found that social media such as Twitter is changing the traditional roles and 
practices of journalists (Bruno, 2011; Hermida, 2010, 2012; Holton & Lewis, 2011; 
Lawrence et al., 2013; Molyneux, 2015).  Many news companies now encourage or even 
require their reporters to use Twitter as part of their professional responsibilities 
(Lawrence et al, 2013; Gleason, 2010; Greer & Ferguson, 2011; Lowery, 2009; Picard, 
2009). Some researchers have found that journalists often use Twitter more frequently for 
expressing opinions, editorializing, and personal insights rather than for straight news-
reporting (Lawrence et al., 2013; Lasorsa et al., 2012; Hermida, 2010).  Lee et al. (2016) 
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examined the political ideologies of journalists in South Korea and found that reporters 
from liberal media outlets used Twitter with much more frequency than those from 
conservative media organizations, and they used it not only to convey news but to 
interact with the public even more than to interact with their friends.  
The 2016 American election saw the insurgence of conservative social media 
“bots,” programs that automatically retweeted Twitter comments by the thousands, from 
conservative sources such as Fox News’ Sean Hannity, GOP strategist Karl Rove, 
Senator Ted Cruz, and a small army of independent conservative activists (Timberg, 
2017; Albright, 2016). These automated Twitter accounts are generally used by 
conservative sources, and are known to be used in at least 17 countries, creating what was 
called by Oxford Internet Institute professor Philip N. Howard as “a synthetic 
conversation” instead of a real public conversation, one that makes it “very difficult to 
know what consensus looks like” (Timberg, 2017, n.p.). Even before Election Day 2016, 
one study had found that about 15% of Trump’s social media followers were bots (Fox-
Brewster, 2016) and another study had found that 33% of Trump’s positive hashtags were 
generated by bots, compared to 22% of Clinton’s positive comments (Kottasova, 2016). 
Many of these tweets from bots commonly are deleted within hours or days—up to 20% 
of them—and are no longer accessible, making it difficult for researchers to reproduce 
results (Liu, Kliman-Silver and Mislove, 2014). However, researcher Howard said: “If 
you removed all the bots, it would seem that Trump is still more popular and has more 
traffic” (Kottasova, 2016, n.p.).  Some have suggested that Russia used social media in 
this way as a dangerous new route for manipulating public opinion and undermining the 
credibility of democratic governments (Calabresi, 2017).  
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Much of the 2016 election media agenda was dominated by events relating to an 
email hack of Clinton’s campaign manager as well as of the Democratic National 
Committee (DNC) during the summer, some of which were published widely and 
reflected party in-fighting, as well as donations from foreign individuals. The Washington 
Post reported that Russians were responsible for the hacks, although a Romanian hacker 
called “Guccifer 2.0” tried to take the credit and draw attention away from the Russians. 
But independent research firms quickly confirmed it was the Russians behind the hack, 
and that it was they who gave the email files to Wikileaks (Vitkovskaya, Granados & 
Muyskens, 2017), although founder Julian Assange denied the source was Russia. On 
October 7, a video emerged from “Access Hollywood” of Trump making lewd comments 
about women; within an hour, Wikileaks released thousands of new emails that had been 
stolen from John Podesta, Clinton’s campaign manager. 
However, Benkler, Faris, Roberts, and Zuckerman (2017) found that the 2016 
election media agenda was driven not by Russians but by Breitbart News, whose 
influence created a common mainstream media agenda that reflected Trump’s preferred 
themes, particularly immigration topics, attacks on Hillary Clinton, and misleading 
messages (or “fake news”) about the integrity of all media that opposed him. Fake news 
are stories that distort or invent facts, and are usually created by websites or producers to 
appear credible at face value. Fake news was shown to influence partisan media in 2016 
(Silverman, 2016; Vargo, Guo & Amazeen, 2017). Other studies have indicated that 
digital tools such as Twitter need further study to advance knowledge of information 
subsidies (Waters, Tindal & Morton, 2010) and its function as an agenda-building tool in 
elections (Woolley, Limperos & Oliver, 2010). This study explores the information 
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subsidies—from Breitbart and beyond--during the 2016 election as they appeared on 
Twitter, to expand research beyond the effects of partisan media, but also to examine how 
agenda-building on Twitter reaches a global audience. Previous agenda-building studies 
have not focused enough on the international implications of such information subsidies 
on Twitter. 
International Twitter Comments and Cultural Context 
Some studies have examined agenda-building using the principle of public 
diplomacy. Park and Lim (2014) examined public diplomacy through social media in 
South Korea and Japan, and network analysis revealed Japan had more diverse sources 
but that Korea more successfully engaged the public on social media. Twitter provides 
insight into the varied social media practices of each culture in their respective feeds. 
Hall (1976) and Hofstede (1993) described distinctions between high-context cultures 
that rely on subtlety in communication messages--as their citizens have societal values 
that are collective in nature--and low-context cultures, which value individualism above 
all else and need messages to be clear and explicit. The nations represented in this study 
represent both types of cultures, and analysis of Twitter use about the same topic may add 
to knowledge about the effects of boundless social media on existing cultural structures. 
For example, Twitter itself is a decentralized low-context environment, where trust is not 
built up over time and messages are often rapid and explicit. But it may be a place where 
a low-context culture such as the U.S. finds itself acting as a collective, rising up together 
as a Twitter population to address a particular social issue, one that also crosses borders 
and merges with a similar movement in another nation, creating group identities that 
would not exist without social media. This study explores whether the Twitter 
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environment encourages more independence or interdependence among citizens of the 
globe, who may or may not be stakeholders in the issue of focus. 
There may be some limitations to studying Twitter, but it does have advantages 
over other platforms such as Facebook (which is private), and Snapchat and Instagram 
(which do not have hyperlinks or the capacity to share or “retweet” messages, images and 
websites). Twitter effectively provides infinite exponential exposure for a story well 
before the “truth has pulled on his boots.” However, Twitter users are a self-selecting 
group and may not be representative of the nations or their media. Twitter is a platform 
that allows for public access and analysis, but there is room for manipulation that may not 
be easily identified, as mentioned earlier about the “bot” accounts that are quickly deleted 
after posting messages. The self-reported identities and motivations of actual users on 
Twitter also present a challenge. There is a public profile on Twitter which identifies who 
each user is, with a small biography. For the most part, journalists are identifiable on 
Twitter because it is in their professional interest to be straightforward. Journalists want a 
lot of followers, they want to show their bosses how popular they are, and to introduce a 
story that may gain traction and get picked up by other media (Parmelee, 2014). Some 
journalists are better known (and respected) than other journalists but lesser-known news 
writers from smaller markets are talented and also have large followings. A potential 
weakness of studying Twitter based on agenda-building is the fact that there may be 
other, simultaneous channels through which news stories are created and proliferate. And, 
of course, professional journalists have a roster of reliable sources and public officials 
who are not reached through Twitter. In other words, journalists who build the agenda 
have many sources other than Twitter and various social media. 
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Another challenge of examining Twitter is the “echo chamber.” McCombs and 
Shaw (1997) described how consumers started to seek out the news they prefer to hear 
from a selection of cable channels, news that agrees with their own perspectives. The 
arrival of social media in the late 2000s created even more of a personalized news feed 
for every individual who wants to block out stories they won’t like. This condition may 
reveal that the agenda-building that occurs on Twitter is mainly a feedback loop in a 
filtered bubble, with little or no exposure to followers who are not like-minded. In fact, a 
recent study by MIT Media Lab found that 20% of all election-related Twitter comments 
about the election came from people who only “follow” Hillary Clinton or who only 
“follow” Donald Trump, not both of them (Chou, 2016). This same study found that 
Trump followers on Twitter largely made many more comments than Clinton followers.  
By adding a larger international component to this study, such filters are more easily 
revealed, in addition to insights about American agendas in media systems around the 
globe. Of course, this particular shortcoming is not restricted to Twitter studies—this 
limitation would occur in studies of television news broadcasts as well as print news. 
Twitter is sorely in need of more academic studies. Other studies in agenda-
building, in the era before Twitter, had to rely on data such as press release content 
analyses and journalist interviews. Social media and digital tools that seek out keywords 
for analysis enable researchers to expand on knowledge of this theory. Agenda-building 
is evolving as new media evolves, as the public not only chooses its preferred media 
outlets but also participates in them. Twitter feeds and news sites engage consumers; 
indeed, they recruit consumers as (unpaid) sources of news and features. Someone who 
photographs an alligator on the street may see it blasted on national media the next day, 
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then transformed into a Twitter meme about Hillary killing animals to make new shoes. 
The extent of citizen-generated content can be compared and contrasted with its re-use 
(retweets) by journalists, in the U.S. and in other countries who also use Twitter for 
agenda-building. This is only one aspect which can be explored within the many research 
opportunities afforded by Twitter. There may be limitations to Twitter data—including 
the simple fact that randomized samples will be a small proportion of the total—but it is a 
rich resource for agenda-building studies of the 21
st
 century. Twitter demands study 
based on agenda-building, to build knowledge about news-making as well as knowledge 
about the theory itself. 
Research Questions 
Donald Trump always has had more Twitter followers (17.1 million) than Hillary 
Clinton (11.6 million) (Twitter.com, 2016). The Shorenstein Center on Media at 
Harvard’s Kennedy School (Patterson, 2016) and the MIT Media Lab (Chou, 2016) 
found that mainstream American news coverage—print, broadcast and digital--of both 
Clinton and Trump were “overwhelmingly negative in tone and extremely light on 
policy” (Patterson, 2016, p. 1). Trump’s coverage was 77% negative, and Clinton’s 
coverage was 63% negative. The Shorenstein study found that the press was not 
necessarily biased in favor of liberal positions, but that it was biased in preference of 
negative tones. The coverage of Trump was always greater than coverage of Clinton, 
throughout the 2016 campaign. The Shorenstein study also found that most topics in the 
news were about the “horserace,” i.e., who was ahead in the polls (42% of stories), 
followed by other topics (personal qualities, leadership experience, 24%), controversies 
(17% of stories) and policy stands (10%).  This was in keeping with studies of 
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mainstream media sources in previous presidential elections. The author proposed that 
negative coverage has a leveling effect that opens the door to “charlatans” and 
indiscriminate criticism that can blur the distinctions between earnest politicians and 
pretenders, between issues of valid concerns and inconsequential ones—the proliferation 
of false equivalencies. Another Harvard study examined both mainstream and social 
media coverage of the 2016 presidential candidates and found largely negative stories 
about both candidates, but that the media agenda itself focused mostly on Trump’s 
signature issue, immigration, and that the leading media of conservative consumers were 
highly partisan and relatively new media outlets, such as InfoWars, Fox and Breitbart 
(Faris, Roberts, Etling, Bourrassa, Zuckerman & Benkler, 2017). Negative news erodes 
trust in the press, currently at its lowest level since such polling began decades ago 
(Patterson, 2016).   
While it may be true that American Twitter users shared the same tones as 
mainstream media, it may be different for users in other countries. For example, Russia is 
being investigated by multiple agencies for having used Twitter commenters to cast favor 
on candidate Trump (Rupar, 2017), thus the tones may be more positive for Trump in that 
nation. This study will examine whether Twitter comments were negative, neutral or 
positive, and compare the differences between the six nations. 
The MIT Media Lab “Electome” post-election study in 2016 revealed that overall 
negative comments were more likely to be retweeted than were positive comments 
(Chou, 2016). The study found that the correlation of negative words in stories shared by 
Donald Trump followers were three times more frequent than non-Trump followers. 
However, Donald Trump followers also were less likely to follow mainstream media 
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Twitter feeds, meaning the online world of Trump fans did not interact with mainstream 
media online as much as Clinton followers did. Most research on international media 
coverage are studies based on framing theory and that focus on issues relating to 
terrorism and war (e.g., Elena, 2016; Yarchi et al, 2013), on natural or man-made 
disasters (e.g. Jiminez-Martinez, 2014; Wang et al, 2013; Pal & Dutta, 2012; Kim & Lee, 
2008), and a very few focus on cultural distinctions between media sources and subject 
nations (e.g., Ramanathan, 2016; Sobel, 2015). The MIT post-election study identified 
the most common topics among Clinton and Trump followers, which were 1) gun rights 
2) racial issues 3) immigration 4) terrorism 5) jobs 6) economy and 7) education.  Some 
of these topics—e.g., immigration, terrorism—may be of greater interest in international 
markets. However, post-election news media and law enforcement suggest that some 
Twitter users attempted to influence American people and the election results.  
Ramanathan (2016) found that international news coverage from a proximinal or 
same-language nation contained more positive tones than neutral tones. While studying 
multi-national news coverage of several Malaysian airlines accidents, the author found 
that local and international media “do reflect and mirror the various cultural factors that 
impinge upon the production and dissemination of news” (p. 32). Joye (2009) found that 
western media were more apt to normalize portrayals of inequalities among global 
cultures, thereby consolidating global power hierarchical relations. Walter (2016) 
reported on the characteristics of European countries and the propensity of EU member 
nations to report about one another. She found that countries that had proximity or that 
spoke the same language were more likely to report about each other. This has not been 
examined in relation to social media, nor on a more global parameter. Considering that 
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the English language is spoken in the United States, further examination may show that 
Great Britain will have the next largest volume of tweets about Trump and Clinton and 
the 2016 election. Like the United States, India is a former British colony and has an 
English-speaking population of more than 250 million people, in what is now the world’s 
largest democracy (Times of India, 2010). This number may be only a small portion of 
India’s total population, but it is far greater than the English-speaking population of Great 
Britain (63.2 million). In spite of being a “high-context” nation (Hofstede, 1993; Hall, 
1976), India may demonstrate proximity with the U.S. through the volume and number of 
Twitter comments about the American presidential candidates in 2016. Indeed, a recent 
study by this author revealed that government sources and diplomats largely and 
positively tweeted about India and the U.S. during reciprocal state visits in 2014 and 
2015, as much as or even more than mainstream media did (O’Boyle, in press). The 
present study will expand on cultural aspects of international agenda-building by 
examining the effects of language on social media content. In addition, this study 
examines sources on Twitter from each nation, to further explore the influence of 
government representatives and others in the agenda reflected in social media.    
Like language, political events and media influences in each nation contribute to 
the agenda, in nations where Twitter comments from any source can be retweeted, 
acquire legitimacy and subsequently influence other mainstream media. There is a gap in 
research when it comes to social media and international agenda-building. For example, a 
democratic nation which has had women elected as leaders (such as India, Great Britain, 
and Brazil) or those from member nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) may have different social media agenda than an authoritarian regime such as 
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China or Russia. Fisk, Fitzgerald and Cokley (2014) explored international media frames 
about nanotechnology innovations and found that Asian media focused on the health 
benefits and economic benefits of such research, while American media focused on its 
benefits for the environment, and British media focused on risks such as cancer and lung 
diseases associated with nanotechnology. Most research has focused on international 
agenda-building in print and broadcast media. Wang, Lee and Wang (2013) wrote about 
how China media has both political and economic incentives when they report on 
international news, particularly because the Chinese government is “keen to promote the 
image of China in the international arena…to build up soft power and to counter 
perceived dominance in international communication by western media organizations” 
(p. 897). Xiang (2013) found that international English-language social media largely 
depicted China as a rising economic and technological power, comprised mostly of 
retweets from mainstream media agenda-setters in the U.S. and U.K., largely positive or 
neutral except for a few mentions of authoritarianism, human rights and pollution. But in 
China itself, as found by Zheng and Huang (2016), international news is still tempered by 
ideological policies of the state.  
 Park, Wang and Pinto (2016) used indexing theory to compare the content of 
German and American media about post-Fukushima nuclear news, and found that 
German news focused on the themes of increasing safety regulations and establishing 
non-nuclear energy sources, while Americans focused not on diverse debate but on 
themes of natural disaster and failure of Japanese infrastructure. This media coverage 
mirrored each government’s views and respective politics regarding nuclear power. The 
researchers recommended that American journalists use more foreign sources in their 
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reporting, to deepen perspectives and to provide more balanced political debate.  Park 
and Lim (2014) used network analysis to compare social media public diplomacy from 
Korea and Japan, and found that Japan sources used more images and videos on social 
media than they did text, and that both countries’ communications were engaged largely 
by non-natives, in particular by those in Europe and the U.S. Golan and Viatchaninova 
(2014) compared the contents of the Russian government’s advertorials (editorials as paid 
advertisements) in major Indian and American newspapers, and found that the most 
prominent agenda these propagated were related to economics, international relations, 
and arts and culture. The Russian government emphasized its global power more 
frequently in Indian newspapers than they did in the American papers, and the authors 
found that such print advertisements—even though they are paid media—are capable of 
being adapted for different nations and therefore play a vital role in a government 
successfully framing its policies to international audiences. Among its many media 
services, Twitter is now also a platform for placement of such “paid editorials” and 
propaganda, and this study may expand on previous research regarding government 
agendas created for international audiences.  
In addition, images are sometimes used on Twitter posts, and they are processed 
more quickly than words. For example, in the 2008 presidential primary, Hillary Clinton 
tweeted a photo of her opponent, Barack Obama, wearing a turban (Grabe & Bucy, 
2009), which implied he may be of African or Muslim heritage. Such image “bites” are 
as persuasive as words, or even more so, on Twitter. Grabe and Bucy (2009) suggest that 
future research should focus on coding images of politicians for character frames that 
include “the ideal candidate” (photos including symbols of patriotism, or candidates 
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hugging children) “the populist campaigner” (showing celebrities or large audiences), or 
the “sure loser” (finger-pointing, small crowds). These image characteristics are 
equivalent to story tones as candidates fight for control of the media tones and topics. 
While this study gathers data about the frequency of images used in Twitter comments, it 
does not code the image contents themselves for affective variables. They are included 
here because Twitter messages are brief; accompanying images may serve to affect the 
overall tone of the messages.  
The Oxford Internet Institute published a data memo in 2017 that examined 
hashtags and links on 7 million Twitter comments in the U.S. during the ten-day election 
period. They found that American Twitter users shared as much “junk news”—
polarizing, conspiracy and false information—as they did legitimate mainstream news 
stories. It was also learned that Russia operated hundred of fake accounts on Twitter and 
Facebook that clearly propagated positive information about Trump and pushed 
unverified stories from Wikileaks about Clinton (Dwoskin et al., 2017; Fandos & Shane, 
2017). Building on this knowledge, this researcher studied the Twitter content of six 
nations, using actual content analysis rather than hashtag analysis with digital data 
programs, and extended the sample to reach around the globe into several nations and 
their Twitter populations. Content analysis also allowed for measuring the tones of the 
comments with  greater detail and reliability than previous Twitter studies. As an 
exploratory study of agenda-building on Twitter from around the world during the 2016 
U.S. presidential campaign, this researcher posed the following research questions: 
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RQ1: Who are the predominant sources in the U.S., U.K., Brazil, Russia, India 
and China that posted the most frequent Twitter comments about candidates Trump and 
Clinton in the ten days prior to the 2016 U.S. presidential election? 
RQ2: What is the nature of the content of these Twitter comments about Trump 
and Clinton, in terms of topics, images and tones? 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
  
The international agenda-building about Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton was 
studied through content analysis of Twitter comments from six nations: the U.S., U.K., 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. The Twitter comment (or tweet, including any featured 
image) was the unit of analysis, and the content analysis was the counts of key categories 
and measurements of the variables, which are described below. The analysis focused on 
manifest content, such as sources and topics, as well as latent content, looking for 
affective tones by using variables such as mentions of “liar” or “crime.” Content analysis 
for Twitter includes form attributes or what Neuendorf (2002) calls “formal features,” 
message elements that are unique to the communications platform, such as hashtags, 
abbreviations and images. 
The nations under study were selected based on volume of Twitter users (see 
Figures 1 and 2 on page 6 and page 7), as well as by their ranking among the world’s 
largest economies and by representing both democratic and authoritarian governments. 
The democratic governments aside from the United States (i.e., U.K., India and Brazil) 
have also elected presidents in the past who were women, and this was a novel 
characteristic of the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign. Russia was included as it is the 
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focus of U.S. federal investigations for potentially using social media to influence the 
American election.  
As this particular agenda-building would have been made in the language of 
Americans, this study is limited in scope to Twitter comments made in the English 
language. This is true for all the nations under study, as coding in other languages is not 
only cumbersome, but non-English tweets might limit the capacity for the content to 
cross borders and cross cultures, and may fail to influence the international media 
agenda. This language restriction to English may be a minor limitation and, for this 
study’s purpose, the sample is still quite revealing. Other studies of social media in 
international environments have examined English-only comments because it is the 
dominant language of social media around the world.  For example, Xiang (2013) looked 
at how international social media in the English language—including Facebook and 
Twitter--framed images of China to the global public. Gurman and Ellenberger (2015) 
studied English-language international tweets for a study in crisis communication after 
the 2010 Haiti earthquake. The use of English language facilitates the potential reach of 
comments for this particular event, i.e., someone’s comments in English are more likely 
to be read by actual Americans. Twitter is a very limited platform however (only 140 
characters) and does not require perfect language skills, so non-native speakers may feel 
it is easy to post a message or even merely a candidate’s name with an exclamation point. 
Park and Lim (2014) found that Japanese users of Facebook often used English language, 
as those users were “targeting domestic users along with the foreign public on social 
media” (p. 91).  
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    Data Collection 
 The data for this study encompass Twitter comments, sources, message contents 
and tones for a total of 6,000 Twitter comments in a 10-day period, leading up to the 
2016 election. This data were compiled and randomly selected by Sysomos Media 
Analysis, a social intelligence engine that collects data from online social media around 
the world (Jang, Park, & Lee, 2016). This study focused on individual tweets produced 
between October 30 and November 8, 2016. Originally, the target sample dates ran 
through November 9, but pilot coding revealed that every tweet after Election Day 
(November 8) was positive in tone for Trump and negative for Clinton, as this reflected 
the election results. Including the day after the election skewed the overall tones in favor 
of Trump, so the sample was changed to exclude November 9. These dates immediately 
before the election date (November 8) were  when Twitter volume was high, and 
excluded post-election coverage of Trump’s victory. Other coding adjustments made 
after the pilot coding are discussed in the sections below. 
  Only English language tweets that contained the keyword “Trump” or “Clinton” 
and that originated from the six nations under study (U.S., U.K. Brazil, Russia, India, 
China) were included in the search. Retweets themselves were excluded, as the study 
aimed to examine which sources were creating the agenda, not duplicating one from other 
sources. Thus “and NOT RT” was included in the keyword search on Sysomos. Five 
hundred tweets were selected from each country using the keyword “Trump,” and five 
hundred more were selected from each country using the keyword “Clinton.” The 
selection of random sub-samples for analysis came from the approximate tallies listed in 
Table 3.1 
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Table 3.1 
Number of Twitter Comments for Each Candidate 
About:        Trump      Clinton 
United States    12,888,880  6,093,110 
United Kingdom        675,900     291,200 
India          184,330     103,510 
Brazil          324,600       11,400 
China            27,700       15,100 
Russia            18,400       11,400 
 
 
Using systematic sampling, a manageable quantity from each country of 500 
tweets about each candidate was selected, to reach the goal of 6,000 total Twitter 
comments posted about the candidates in the days immediately prior to the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election. Sysomos generated a random sample of 3,000 tweets for each 
keyword in each country, which were downloaded into Excel files. The researcher chose 
every sixth tweet from this sample for the random sample of 500. It was observed that 
approximately 10% of Twitter accounts and comments had been deleted or suspended.  
These and any unrelated comments were excluded and randomly replaced from the 
Sysomos sample of 3,000. The researcher discovered that excluding “RT” for retweets in 
Russia also excluded original tweets from Russia Today, now known as RT. Thus, the 
sample for Russia was downloaded into Excel in its entirety, and the random sample 
excluded retweets by hand. A handful of extra comments were coded from each country, 
in the event that more were eliminated as unrelated or the researcher was unable to find 
their links. Thus, some nations have a few more than 1,000 and the grand total of this 
study is 6,019. The sample was a very small proportion of actual Twitter comments, and 
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also not reflective of the preponderance of Twitter comments about Trump, which were 
roughly double the frequency of Clinton comments. But this does not detract from the 
goal of this study,  to identify the sources who set the media agenda, and to provide the 
foundation for future research into the effects and behaviors caused by repeated exposure 
and media frames.   
The sample size of 6,019 was large enough to perform content analysis on the 
overall components of frequent Twitter comments in this period. Xiang (2013) had 
performed content analysis on  4,250 international social media comments about China.  
Gurman and Ellenberger (2015) examined 2,616 tweets around the world for their study 
about Haiti earthquake messages. Lee, Kim and Kim (2015) analyzed content in 494 
tweets in their study of Korean journalists’ topics.  Other recent studies, such as the 
Oxford Internet Institute study of Russian propaganda (Howard, 2017), examined 
millions of tweets using automated coding systems, which was limited to those tweets 
that contained selected hashtags, and sources were identified through their URL 
addresses by the program Streaming API. The present study was not limited to hashtags, 
and examined sources through their actual profile pages, providing greater detail, validity 
and reliability about thousands of users in several countries. 
 The tweets for this study were downloaded from Sysomos into Excel. Coders 
used the embedded link in one Excel column to copy and then “Paste and Go” directly to 
the Twitter comment online, which showed the tweet as it originally appeared, including 
attendant images, links, comments, number of retweets, and so forth. Coders clicked on 
the user name to observe the profile page, the user’s other comments and number 
offollowers, and email address or website. This information helped confirm an 
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individual’s or a company’s identity and authenticity, which was most often clearly 
evident.  
Coding Variables and Analysis 
Quantitative analysis allows for isolating variables and relating them to the 
magnitude and frequency of relationships with highly reliable and valid measures. The 
context variables were determined by the research questions; variables here include the 
individual nations as well as the keywords “Trump” and “Clinton.” Substantive and 
affective variables for coding were determined by previous content analyses and other 
studies, which are described in the sections below. In addition, the researcher and a 
second coder performed pilot coding and examined 500 Twitter comments representing 
each country under study. The pilot coding helped make slight adjustments to the final 
coding instrument, as also noted below.  
Individual Sources 
Analyzing sources is key to this study, as this variable will determine who is 
building the agenda on Twitter for this particular event. For an individual or solitary 
source, this would mean a typical consumer or unaffiliated “citizen,” or a journalist (such 
as Dan Rather), a politician (e.g., Senator Cory Booker, or Mayor Bill deBlasio), a 
diplomat (such as an ambassador in Brazil), a government employee (someone who 
identifies as working at the EPA, for example), or a nonpolitical celebrity (e.g., Beyonce, 
or Stephen Colbert). These particular types of individual sources were identified in  
previous social media studies about the role of audience members as content creators. For 
example, Golan and Himelboim (2015) studied directional news flow and global network 
analysis on Twitter and singled out sources who were unaffiliated individuals as opposed 
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to media, governments or organizations. Hermida, Lewis & Zamith (2014) studied 
Twitter comments of journalists during the Arab Spring of 2011, identifying them 
through their profile pages. Lee, Kim and Kim (2015) performed content analysis of 52 
Korean journalists’ tweets to determine whether they covered public affairs or more 
personal topics. Shoemaker and Reese (1996) had discussed the importance of the 
characteristics of individual journalists who build an agenda. The current study aimed to 
narrow in on a variety of individual sources who set the Twitter agenda in the 2016 
election, and coded separately for individual, journalist, politician, diplomat, government 
employee, and non-political celebrity.  
Group Sources 
In addition to sources conceptualized as being an individual, as described above, 
there were separate variables to identify whether the Twitter source was a “group,” such 
as a news media organization, (e.g., The New York Times or CBS News) as opposed to  a 
named individual journalist (which fell into the individuals category above). This type of 
“group” source also included the Twitter profile of a non-news business, such as Wells 
Fargo or McDonalds, of an institute or university such as Brookings or Harvard, an 
activist or nonprofit organization (e.g., The Sierra Club or Planned Parenthood), or an 
official government agency account such as the National Parks Service or the Department 
of Homeland Security. Other content analysis studies have singled out such Twitter 
sources that are groups. Golan and Himelboim’s (2015) study on news flow focused on 
Twitter mediators that were news media outlets, governments and non-government 
organizations such as Wikileaks. Howard’s study at the Oxford Internet Institute (2017) 
singled out sources that were professional news outlets, amateur news outlets, 
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government agencies, think tanks, universities, and political parties, among others. Kim, 
Xiang and Kiousis (2011) and Kiousis, Kim, Ragas, Wheat, Kochhar, Svensson and 
Miles (2015) performed agenda-building content analyses during election campaigns and 
also focused on sources such as news media, policymakers, businesses, interest groups, 
and political parties, among others. Lotan, Graeff, Ananny, Gaffney, Pearce and Boyd 
(2011) studied what types of actors on Twitter started and propagated information flow 
during Middle East uprisings, and classified “actors” into groups and individuals such as 
news organizations, journalists, individuals, non-media organizations, celebrities, 
politicians and activist groups. The categorizations in studies such as these informed the 
selection of source types for this study.   
 In addition, the coders counted the numbers of “likes” and “retweets” for each 
Twitter comment, as previously done in public diplomacy studies by Park and Lim 
(2014) and Lotan et al., (2011) study of information flow. This served to further 
characterize the reach and influence of the varied sources. 
Dominant Topics 
Previous studies in agenda-building of political campaigns have analyzed media 
content for various topics.  For example, Kiousis, Kim, McDevitt and Ostowski (2009) 
studied election campaign topics in U.S. mainstream media that included education, 
terrorism, international problems, social issues, immigration and war. Sheafer and 
Wiemann (2005) studied agenda-building in Israel by examining whether media content 
focused on domestic policy or international security. Gruzczynski and Wagner (2016) 
selected topics for their “agenda uptake” study of 2008 election issues in the media by 
examining people’s Google search terms on Google Trends, which they cross-referenced 
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with the internet data-mining tool called Meme Tracker. They selected topics that 
appeared in Meme Tracker, including abortion, economy, Iraq, and--in order to measure 
uptake of issues that were considered scandalous--“lipstick on a pig,” an epithet used by 
Barack Obama to describe his opponent’s economic plan, one that was quickly adopted 
by the GOP and used against him. Lotan et al. (2011) used the Twitter application 
programming interface (API) to search select keywords. Golan and Viatchaninova (2014) 
examined Russia’s use of paid advertorials in India  and the U.S., including variables of 
interest such as international politics, domestic issues, human rights, science, and human 
interest stories, among many others. Lasorsa, Lewis and Holton (2012) performed content 
analysis on journalists’ tweets and coded for topics such as business, politics, and 
entertainment or celebrities.  
Variables for this study came from studies such as these, and were selected here 
to include the campaign itself or the “horserace,” including polls or campaign rallies, 
social issues (such as religion and gender rights), international relations/immigration/war, 
American topics such as the economy, constitutional rights and income taxes; and 
personal attacks, meaning that the candidate was presented as incompetent, untrustworthy 
or criminal. As this study examined the perspectives of international social media, the 
topic list was extended to include the effect on the host nation of the Twitter source (e.g., 
“is this American candidate good for India?”).  Given that Twitter is a limited space for 
posting messages with only 140 characters, the topics were relatively clear and simple to 
code. 
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Secondary Topics 
 Additional topics emerged from pilot coding of a sample of 500 tweets, as well as 
from the data collection engine Sysomos Media Analysis, which was prompted for 
“Topic Insights” and identified popular keywords in these Twitter samples, such as 
“Wikileaks” and “Comey,” which were added to the coding sheet. Prior studies used 
similar results from analytical tools Google Trends and Meme Tracker (Gruzcynski & 
Wagner, 2016). Secondary topics for this study thus included “email server,” 
“FBI/Comey,” “computer hacking,” “sexual assault,” “Wikileaks/Assange,” and “tax 
return.” In most instances—more than 80% of the 6019 comments--there were no 
mentions of these secondary topics at all, and those tweets were coded as zero. As this 
subcategory seemed relatively negligible, the data were collected but not analyzed in this 
study. 
Images 
Similar to the secondary topics, many tweets did not contain any image at all, and 
thus, this variable most often was coded as zero. However, when the tweet contained an 
image, the coders marked its existence by coding it as an image of Trump (1) or Clinton 
(2), both candidates (3) or another subject completely (4).  This data might inform 
research on cultural aspects of Twitter. For example, Park and Lim (2014) studied public 
diplomacy on social media in Asia and found that Twitter users in Japan used more 
images than text. Some visual communications studies examined content of images on 
Twitter, such as Seo’s (2014) study propaganda in Twitter images during the 2012 Hamas 
conflict in Israel. Fahmy, Bock and Wanta (2014) briefly discussed the relatively new 
phenomenon of images on Twitter created by citizens in their overview of visual 
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communication theory. Other studies about Twitter that examined news flow or content 
did not consider images at all, such as Lotan et al. (2011), Golan and Himelboim (2016) 
and Gurman and Ellenberger (2015).  While visuals are not the primary focus of the 
present study, the researcher wanted to measure their frequencies and explore their 
presence and variations between candidates and among various cultures. . 
Comment Tone 
Agenda-building suggests that sources “may not just influence what topics are 
covered in media coverage, but also how those topics are portrayed and ultimately how 
they are defined in public opinion” (Kiousis et al., 2006, p. 270). This includes  whether 
the message is positive in tone, or negative, or neutral. Message valence and overall tones 
of news stories and social media posts e have been studied in a variety of media and 
themes. Many of these studies focus on topics such as negative media frames of China in 
global media (Ono & Jiao, 2008; Lams, 2015). Those which focused on election 
campaigns include McCombs, Llamas, Escobar-Lopez and Rey (2000), who studied a 
Spanish general election and measured whether media included affective attributes that 
were positive, such as “a good leader,” and those that were neutral or negative. Golan and 
Wanta (2001) studied the 2000 Republican primary in New Hampshire and found that 
candidate John McCain was covered in media with more positive tones than was George 
W. Bush. Researchers Kiousis, Kim, Ragas, Wheat, Kochhar, Svensson and Miles (2015) 
examined negative, neutral and positive tones in media frames of candidates in the 2012 
U.S. presidential election, and found that these tones were linked to those in the 
information subsidies provided to media. Yoon and Lee (2013) examined media tones 
about Clinton’s 2008 primary race against Obama, and found they were more negative 
 44 
 
 
  
   
 
44 
 
 
for Clinton.  For the present study, coders considered the valence of each Twitter 
comment. For example, calling someone a “crook” or “incompetent” was coded as 
negative in tone, whereas someone who is the “best person for the job” was coded 
positive in tone. Calling someone merely a “Republican” or a “liberal” was considered 
neutral in tone. A rally with a celebrity was considered a positive comment for the 
“campaign/horserace” of either candidate. Positive or negative poll numbers and 
endorsements were also coded, accordingly, as positive or negative tones for a candidate. 
Pilot coding revealed an initial intercoder reliability of 0.74 for Tones. Therefore, 
the coders convened to review and discuss these results, and learned that discrepancies in 
Tone largely were caused by interpreting Twitter messages about FBI investigations. The 
coders resolved the discrepancies by determining that a comment that simply reported the 
FBI investigation of Clinton emails was to be coded as neutral. But if the comment 
suggested that Clinton’s campaign was “in trouble” due to the investigation, or the word 
“criminal” appeared, that Twitter message was coded as negative for her. When the 
coders recoded the pilot sample in this way, the intercoder reliability for Tone improved 
to 0.79. Coders agreed not to seek out any hidden meanings in Twitter comments other 
than what was expressly stated.  
In order to focus and analyze those who were setting the agenda and choosing the 
topics, this study examined only original tweets, not the comments or replies, nor those 
that were retweets (shared from elsewhere). Previous studies have examined the 
frequencies of retweets, such as Lasorsa et al. (2012), who found that 15% of journalists’ 
Twitter posts were retweets from other commenters. Gurman and Ellenberger (2015) 
studied 2,635 tweets during the 2010 Haiti earthquake relief effort and found that 13% of 
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them were retweets. The present study aimed to explore the origins of topics on the media 
agenda, and the researcher opted to exclude the comments that were not original. The 
comments in this study did include those that contained hyperlinks, links to other news 
stories or websites, but not the retweets that originated from another Twitter commenter. 
Lewis et al. (2013) noted that the brevity of Twitter messages may require extra 
examination to discern meaning, as traditional media texts (i.e., print and broadcast 
transcripts) are lengthier and more explicit. They point out that coders must consider 
context and understand “the rhythms of Twitter or the culture around a particular 
hashtag” (p. 48) in order to code them most effectively. Hermida (2010) noted that 
Twitter streams are fragmented and multi-faceted and that the significance of a single 
message has less validity than the aggregate effect of many messages. Therefore, the 
context of messages and size of this study’s sample are limitations. In addition, the ability 
for a Twitter user to create his or her own profile means that the sources are self-defined, 
and these may not clearly be classified as journalist, politician, publicist, everyday 
citizen, and so forth. Many “influential Twitter users do not easily fit into traditional 
categorization schemes” (Lotan et al., 2011, p. 1397).  In spite of these limitations, the 
data are voluminous and randomized, assuring informative results. 
As previously described, the researcher and a second coder reviewed a pilot 
sample of 500 Twitter comments, and refined certain variables and definitions. After 
these modest revisions, a coding sheet was finalized, as shown in Appendix A. 
Reliability 
After training and the pilot tests, the coders moved on to testing for intercoder 
reliability. They coded the topics, sources, retweets, images and tones of a random 
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subsample of 900 Twitter comments (15% of the total) The researcher measured 
intercoder reliability using Krippendorff’s alpha, and the rates of agreement achieved by 
the two coders for key variables were: Nation, 1.0; Date, 1.0; Number of Retweets, 1.0; 
Number of “Likes,” 0.99; Presence of embedded link, 0.92; Source Type, 0.92; Topic, 
0.89; Secondary Topic, 0.90, Image Subject, 0.89, and Comment Tone, 0.79.   
As discussed, the intercoder reliability for Tone of Twitter comment was 
marginally less than 0.80, which is not an optimal score for reliability. However, 
Krippendorff (1980) himself reported studies with alphas below .80, and other 
researchers (Wimmer & Dominick, 2003; Bannerjee, Capozzoli, McSweeney & Sinha, 
1999) proposed a standard minimum alpha of .75, which has been the intercoder 
reliability score for “tone” in other recent content analyses (e.g., Kiousis et al, 2015). As 
such, the score of .79 is acceptable here, particularly for this study which coded content 
from a variety of different cultures.  
The researcher used SPSS for chi-square analysis as well as ANOVA tests for 
means distributions. The Results section below highlights select findings related 
specifically to the research questions.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Sources of Twitter Comments 
Research Question 1 examines the types of sources who commented on Twitter 
about candidates Trump and Clinton. In every nation, the preponderance of sources 
making comments were individuals, “everyday citizens” with no professional affiliation 
or public persona. Depending on the nation, between 56% and 80% of all Twitter 
comments came from individuals, as shown in Table 4.1. As such, no statistical analyses 
were run to determine whether there were significant differences between individuals and 
other source types. The second most frequent commenters were either journalists or news 
media companies. As indicated, the proportions of source types were largely equivalent 
across nations. 
Table 4.1 shows the frequencies of source types for all Twitter comments in the 
sample, comprised from subtotals of roughly 500 comments for each candidate in each 
nation. The first three columns—individual, journalist, politician/celebrity—are sources 
who are individuals and not groups or associations. Coders found that there were very 
few individual diplomats or government employees in the entire sample—in fact, 
virtually none—so these were combined into the “other” category. There were also few 
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celebrities and politicians represented, but they are listed here for comparison purposes. 
The second three columns in Table 4.1 represent “group” Twitter accounts, such as 
official news media companies, other business that are not news-related, institutions and 
nonprofit organizations. There were very few in the latter groups, but are also included in 
the table for comparison purposes. 
To provide additional information about the sources in each nation, and to 
measure the potential impact of these sources in the Twitter universe, this study compiled 
lists of the sources in this study who have the largest numbers of “followers.” Results 
indicated that the most frequent Twitter commenters in each country are everyday 
citizens, many of whom have only a few hundred followers. This list of impactful sources 
includes individual sources such as celebrities and journalists, and mostly large news 
corporations and with global identities. Also included here are actual tweets from the data 
under study, to provide examples of typical posts and the expanse of followers that were 
exposed to them. Table 3 shows the most-followed Twitter sources from the 6019 tweets 
in this study sample, organized by nation. Table 4.2 is followed by six figures that show 
actual Twitter comments from the study sample, as well as observations about the Twitter 
comments in each nation. Additional samples of the actual Twitter comments are 
included in Appendix B. 
As with most countries, the American sample of 1,000 contained Twitter posts 
from major news outlets, and these were the Twitter accounts with the greatest numbers 
of followers. In all of the nations’ samples, there was no other journalist who had nearly 
as many followers as Vox.com editor-in-chief Ezra Klein. While popular celebrities such 
as Ellen DeGeneres and Katy Perry may have many more Twitter followers (73 million 
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and 104 million, respectively) among many others Americans, they were not among the 
random sample in this study. Contrary to the findings of Benkler et al. (2017) and Faris et 
al. (2017), this sample of 1,000 tweets from the U.S. did not contain any that originated 
with Breitbart or InfoWars. Samples are shown in Figure 4.1. 
United Kingdom 
 
Two or three of the predominantly pro-Trump British tweets were from residual 
“bots” whose accounts had not been deleted, such as a user named “Juliette Bot” showing 
a photo of an attractive woman, who had more than 11,000 followers. The U.K. sample 
also showed more than 60 comments from a group called “Israel Bombs Babies,” one of 
many pseudonymous commenters who propagated negative comments claiming Clinton 
was a pedophile and a Satanist. However, the Twitter users with the greatest numbers of 
followers were all news media companies. See samples in Figure 4.2. 
Brazil 
The sample of Twitter comments from Brazil contained a number of anomalies. First, 
there was a total of 320,000 comments using the keyword “Trump” within the dates of 
this study, but only about 11,000 for Clinton, as mentioned in the Methods section. This 
difference in proportion was not so extreme in other nations. Also, the data sample from 
Brazil contained almost no media companies or journalists at all, unlike most other 
countries. Those that are included above, “Reuters” and” TypGyn” news, have relatively 
modest numbers of followers, compared to news outlets in any other nation, which may 
be due to their use of English language. Another unusual Twitter phenomenon in Brazil 
were individuals casting pro-Clinton “votes” in an online poll that linked to the Twitter 
page of a NBC TV affiliate in Connecticut. This same poll was posted more than 50 
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times in Brazil on November 8 by different individuals (see sample in Figure 5), and was 
not observed in any other nation. It appeared to be an automated post, the only one that 
appeared to be in favor of Clinton, and these comprised roughly 10% of her entire (and 
modest) Brazil sample. See two examples in Figure 4.3 
Russia 
Many Russia comments–more than 10% of them—had been deleted or the 
account was “closed” after November 8.  It was observed that many comments in Russia 
contained links to Breitbart and InfoWars.com, more than in other countries, and more 
frequently than links to other American media. It was also noted that the top sources here 
in English language included an American journalism school in St. Petersburg, an 
American columnist for the conservative newspaper Washington Times, a British 
journalist, and an American PR executive (Benador) who was clearly working to promote 
Trump. Benador’s comments always included hashtags such as #MAGA (“Make 
American Great Again,” Trump’s campaign tagline) or #ONLY TRUMP. There were 
very few media companies or Russian journalists in the sample, which may be due to the 
limitation of English language, but may also reflect the efforts of agenda-building in the 
language that easily transmits to the United States. See Figure 4.4. 
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Table 4.1    
Frequency of Twitter comments, by Source Type. 
 Individual Journalist Pol/Celeb  News co Oth bus. Inst/Non Othr 
US 
 -Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
414 
(82.8%) 
372 
(74.4%) 
 
 
20 
(4%) 
26 
(5.2%) 
 
3 
(0.6%) 
0 
(0%) 
  
   36 
(7.2%) 
     56 
(11.2%) 
 
  10 
(2%) 
  16 
(3.2%) 
 
15 
(3%) 
25 
(5%) 
 
2 
(0.4%) 
5 
(1%) 
UK 
 -Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
367 
(73.4%) 
346 
(68.7%) 
 
 
23 
(4.6%) 
17 
(3.4%) 
 
9 
(1.8%) 
5 
(1%) 
  
62 
(12.4%) 
75 
(14.9%) 
 
24 
(4.8%) 
43 
(8.5%) 
 
9 
(1.8%) 
17 
(3.4%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
Brazil 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
437 
(86.7%) 
433 
(85.6%) 
 
14 
(2.8%) 
22 
(4.3%) 
 
4 
(0.8%) 
7 
(1.4%) 
  
13 
(2.6%) 
30 
(5.9%) 
 
7 
(1.4%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
11 
(2.2%) 
 
23 
(4.6% 
1 
(0.2%) 
 
Russia 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
366 
(73.1%) 
283 
(56.5%) 
 
53 
(10.6%) 
89 
(17.8%) 
 
0 
(0%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
  
35 
(7%) 
84 
(16.8%) 
 
34 
(6.8%) 
22 
(4.4%) 
 
11 
(2.2%) 
22 
(4.4%) 
 
2 
(0.4%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
India 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
326 
(65.1%) 
313 
(62.5%) 
 
26 
(5.2%) 
31 
(6.2%) 
 
84 
(16.8%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
 
 
 
101 
(20.2%) 
106 
(21.2%) 
 
30 
(6%) 
25 
(5%) 
 
5 
(1%) 
13 
(2.6%) 
 
4 
(1%) 
10 
(2%) 
 
China 
 -Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
367 
(73.3%) 
352 
(70.4%) 
 
56 
(11.2%) 
56 
(11.2%) 
 
3 
(0.6%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
  
44 
(8.8%) 
46 
(9.2%) 
 
19 
(3.8%) 
28 
(5.6%) 
 
3 
(0.6%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
 
9 
(1.8%) 
13 
(2.6%) 
 
Totals 
 -Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
2277 
(75.7%) 
2099 
(69.7%) 
 
192 
(6.4%) 
241 
(8%) 
 
27 
(0.9%) 
17 
(0.6%) 
  
291 
(9.7%) 
397 
(13.2%) 
 
124 
(4.1%) 
136 
(4.5%) 
 
49 
(1.6%) 
91 
(3%) 
 
47 
(1.5%) 
30 
1% 
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United States 
Table 4.2 
Twitter Sources in this Study Sample that Have the Most Followers 
Nation  Twitter Source    No. of Twitter Followers 
U.S.    The Washington Post     10,509,000  
  Entertainment Weekly      6,483,825  
  NBC News       4,807,000  
  Bloomberg Media      4,050,600  
  USA Today        3,358,600  
The Hill          2,540,000  
Fortune magazine       2,227,200  
Ezra Klein, Vox Media journalist      1,796,007  
 
U.K.  BBC Breaking News     32,357,000 
The Economist      20,706,000  
BBC World News    19,720,000 
The Guardian       6,582,000  
Sky News TV       4,100,000 
Financial Times       2,870,000  
The Independent         2,262,000  
The Telegraph       2,150,000 
 
Brazil   Tony Rocha, unverified “radio and TV director”    2,103,000 
Ricardo Nester, self-described actor and journalist         966,000 
Reuters Brasil          298,000 
Yasmin Mitri, unverified actress        136,000 
Ed Perez, individual         127,000 
TopGyn News           109,000 
Carlos Bolsonaro, conservative politician            116,000 
 
Russia  RT, formerly Russia Today    2,601,870  
Sputnik News                 188,000 
Poynter Journalism School, St. Petersburg                       180,000 
Alexander Nekrassov, unaffiliated journalist        85,000  
L. Todd Wood, Washington Times correspondent             71,000 
Shaun Walker, Guardian correspondent                   67,000 
Eliana Benador, Individual, PR consultant                   63,000  
 
India  NDTV      9,940,000 
Times Now TV     7,820,000 
ABP News TV     6,980,000 
The Hindustan Times    5,700,000 
India Today TV     4,380,000 
The Hindu     4,350,000 
CNN News 18     3,670,000 
Zee TV News     3,520,000 
ANI (Asian News Intl) 2,080,000 
 
China  China Xinhua News    10,100,000  
People’s Daily, China      3,780,000 
CGTN China Global Television Network     3,330,000 
China.org          469,000 
Ryan Edward Chou, CGTV journalist,           384,000  
Global Times          314,000  
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Figure 4.1 
 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top U.S. Sources 
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Figure 4.2 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top UK.. Sources 
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Figure 4.3 
 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top Brazil Sources 
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Figure 4.4 
 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top Russia Sources 
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Figure 4.5 
 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top India Sources 
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India 
India was notable because although the sources were mostly individuals, there 
were many more news media companies on Twitter than there were in other nations. 
More than 20% of Twitter comments about both candidates came from major television 
or print news companies in India, whereas in most other countries these comprised 10% 
or less. This may indicate that media companies in India are much more active on social 
media than those in other countries, or, perhaps, individuals simply use Twitter less in 
India. English is an official language in India, of course, and English language news is 
already popular here, in print and television, so Twitter may be more of a natural 
platform for India media than other international cultures. See Figure 4.5. 
China 
 
In China, government control means that average citizens do not have internet 
access to Twitter or Facebook. Chinese consumers use Weibo and WeChat instead. 
Therefore, as expected, the Twitter sources in this study were largely media companies 
and journalists; the individuals posting on Twitter here were primarily ex-patriate 
Americans and British living in China. But the numbers of followers for these English 
language state-controlled media companies are impressive, e.g., Xinhua News  with 10 
million  Twitter followers around the world is equal in reach as The Washington Post is. 
China sample tweets are shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Topics of Twitter Comments 
Research Question 2 addressed the general topics featured in Twitter comments 
about the two presidential candidates. As shown in Table 4.3, the most frequent topics of 
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Twitter comments were somewhat divergent about Trump and Clinton. This is further 
examined below.  
As shown in Table 4.4, the most frequent topic in Twitter comments, in every 
nation, was the campaign or “horserace.” This is particularly true for comments about 
Trump, where nearly 70% focused on the race, somewhat consistently across nations, 
whereas for Clinton the frequency of comments about the campaign was lower, about 
49%,  of the time, but it was still the most frequent topic. The second most frequent topic 
was a personal attack on the candidate—but there were more than twice as many personal 
attack comments on Clinton (1182) than there were about Trump (454). This is probably 
due to the fact that so many comments talked about the renewed FBI investigation into 
Clinton emails and how she remained under a cloud of suspected criminal activity. There 
is a significant difference between Clinton and Trump in these Twitter topic categories, in 
every country in this study, as shown in Table 4.4. 
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Figure 4.6 
 
Samples of Twitter Comments from Top China Sources 
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Table 4.3      
Main Topic in Twitter Comments 
 Campaign Own 
nation 
Social 
issue 
Internat’l/ 
immigration 
US 
issue  
Personal 
Attack 
Other 
 
 
US 
-Trump 
 
 -Clinton 
 
372 
(74.4%) 
190 
(38%) 
 
0 
(0%) 
0 
(0%) 
 
 
10 
(2%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
 
12 
(2.4%) 
5 
(1%) 
 
12 
(2.4%) 
7 
(1.4%) 
 
81 
(16.2%) 
285 
(57%) 
 
13 
(2.6%) 
11 
(2.2%) 
 
UK 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
   
 
 
346 
(69.2%) 
256 
(50.7%) 
 
10 
(2%) 
6 
(1.1%) 
 
7 
(1.4%) 
6 
(1.1%) 
 
17 
(3.4%) 
22 
(4.3%) 
 
8 
(1.6%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
 
100 
(20%) 
189 
(37.5%) 
 
12 
(2.4%) 
23 
(4.5%) 
Brazil 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
375 
(74.4%) 
257 
(50.7%) 
 
14 
(2.8%) 
2 
(0.4%) 
 
1 
(0.2%) 
5 
(1%) 
 
23 
(4.6%) 
11 
(2.1%) 
 
4 
(0.8%) 
5 
(1%) 
 
66 
(13.1%) 
198 
(39.1%) 
 
21 
(4.1%) 
28 
(5.5%) 
 
Russia 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton   
 
 
351 
(70%) 
217 
(43.3%) 
 
37 
(7.4%) 
29 
(5.8%) 
 
1 
(0.2%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
 
15 
(3%) 
15 
(3%) 
 
8 
(1.6%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
 
67 
(13.3%) 
217 
(43.3%) 
 
22 
(4.4%) 
19 
(3.8%) 
 
India 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
324 
(64.6%) 
280 
(55.8%) 
 
33 
(6.6%) 
43 
(8.5%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
 
36 
(7.2%) 
6 
(1.2%) 
 
15 
(3%) 
12 
(2.4%) 
 
74 
(14.8%) 
133 
(26.5%) 
 
13 
(2.6%) 
24 
(4.8%) 
 
China 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
   
 
 
333 
(66.4%) 
270 
(54%) 
 
28 
(5.6%) 
22 
(4.4%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
1 
(0.2%) 
 
18 
(3.6%) 
19 
(3.8%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
3 
(0.6%) 
 
66 
(13.2%) 
160 
(32%) 
 
44 
(8.8%) 
25 
(5%) 
Totals 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
2101 
(69.9%) 
1470 
(48.8%) 
 
122 
(4%) 
102 
(3.4%) 
 
31 
(1.1%) 
18 
(0.6%) 
 
121 
(4%) 
78 
(2.6%) 
 
53 
(1.8%) 
32 
(1.1%) 
 
454 
(15.1%) 
1182 
(39.2%) 
 
125 
(4.2%) 
130 
(4.3%) 
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Table 4.4 
Most Frequent Twitter Topics about Each Candidate 
 
  Clinton  Trump   2  df Sig. 
US 
-Campaign 190 (38%)  372 (74.4%)  134.565 1 .000 
-Pers. attack 285 (57.5%)  81 (16.2%)  150.840 1 .000 
UK 
-Campaign 256 (50.7%)  346 (69.2%)  36.158  1 .000  
-Pers. attack 189 (37.5%)  100 (20%)  36.966  1 .000 
Brazil   
-Campaign 257 (50.7%)   375 (74.4%)  63.648  1 .000 
  
-Pers. attack 198 (39.1%)     66 (13.1%)  100.218 1 .000 
Russia 
-Campaign 217 (43.3%)  351 (70%)  64.830  1 .000  
-Pers. attack 217 (43.3%)    67 (13.3%)  113.051 1 .000  
India 
-Campaign 280 (55.8%)   324 (64.6%)  8.805  1 .003 
-Pers. attack 133 (26.5%)     74 (14.8%)  26.583  1 .000 
China 
-Campaign 270 (54%)   333 (66.4%)  16.750  1 .000 
-Pers. attack 160 (32%)     66 (13.2%)  50.742  1 .000 
Totals 
-Campaign 1470 (48.8%)  2101 (69.9%)  25.112  5 .000 
-Pers. attack 1182 (39.2%)    454 (15.1%)  22.820  5 .000 
  
 
Images in Twitter Comments 
 
 Research Question 2 addressed the content in the Twitter comments, and this 
includes the frequency of images and their subjects. Results shown in Table 4.5 show that 
most tweets (more than 68% of the total) did not contain any image at all. Of those that 
did contain images, commenters were more likely to include an image when the comment 
was about Clinton (32%) than if it was about Trump (24.8%). Comments about Trump 
featured his image a total of 291 times, compared to Clinton comments showing her 
image in 473 tweets.  
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Table 4.5        
 
Frequency of Image Subject in Twitter Comments  
 
 No image Trump Clinton Both Other 
US 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
415 
(83%) 
377 
(75.4%) 
 
35 
(7%) 
5 
(1%) 
 
6 
(1.1%) 
82 
(16.4%) 
 
5 
(1%) 
9 
(1.8%) 
 
39 
(7.8%) 
27 
(5.4%) 
UK 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
338 
(67.6%) 
337 
(66.8%) 
 
57 
(11.4%) 
11 
(2.1%) 
 
5 
(1%) 
75 
(14.9%) 
 
16 
(3.2%) 
31 
(2%) 
 
54 
(10.8%) 
50 
(10%) 
Brazil 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
365 
(72.4%) 
302 
(59.6%) 
 
44 
(8.7%) 
10 
(2%) 
 
10 
(2%) 
70 
(13.8%) 
 
23 
(4.5%) 
67 
(13.2%) 
 
62 
(12.3%) 
57 
(11.2%) 
Russia 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
348 
(69.4%) 
350 
(69.8%) 
 
58 
(11.6%) 
14 
(2.8%) 
 
17 
(3.3%) 
91 
(18.8%) 
 
19 
(3.7%) 
8 
(1.5%) 
 
59 
(11.7%) 
38 
(7.5%) 
India 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
338 
(67.5%) 
322 
(64.2%) 
 
67 
(13.3%) 
14 
(2.8%) 
 
13 
(2.6%) 
78 
(15.5%) 
 
37 
(7.4%) 
39 
(7.7%) 
 
46 
(9.2%) 
48 
(9.6%) 
China 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
428 
(85.4%) 
428 
(85.4%) 
 
30 
(6%) 
7 
(1.4%) 
 
6 
(1.2%) 
77 
(15.4%) 
 
10 
(2%) 
31 
(6.2%) 
 
27 
(5.4%) 
25 
(5%) 
Totals 
-Trump 
 
-Clinton 
 
 
2262 
(75.2%) 
2048 
(68%) 
 
291 
(9.7%) 
61 
(2%) 
 
57 
(1.9%) 
473 
(15.7%) 
 
110 
(3.6%) 
185 
(6.1%) 
 
287 
(9.5%) 
245 
(8.1%) 
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Images were used most frequently in Brazil, the U.K. and in India, but only 
marginally moreso than in other countries. The researcher considered various factors in 
the use of images, and transformed the data to see whether use of images corresponded to 
whether a country was considered a high-context or low-context culture (Hall, 1976; 
Hofstede, 1993), and found there was no correlation. Next, the researcher examined 
whether use of images corresponded to whether the nation was a democracy or a state-
controlled regime, which also proved not significant. While the results of Tone analysis is 
reported in detail later in this section , the researcher did find a relationship between Tone 
of content and the use of images. If the comment had an image and was negative in tone, 
it was most likely to contain an image of Clinton. Trump’s face appeared mostly 
frequently in positive comments (146); Clinton’s image appeared mostly in negative 
comments (262), all of which were most frequently posted by Russian Twitter users. 
These numbers are not large, but provide an important foundation to additional studies 
about images in political communication and social media. Overall comment tones are 
discussed in greater detail in their own section on page 75. 
Table 4.6 
Tone and Presence of Image in Twitter Comment  
Trump Image 
  US UK Brazil Russia India China   2   df Sig. 
Negative 21 26 28 12 35   7 
Neutral    1 17 14 24 14   7 
Positive 18 25 12 36 32 23 
   Total  40 68 54 72 81 37 41.452   10 .000 
 
Clinton Image 
  US UK Brazil Russia India China   2   df Sig. 
Negative 49 44 36  68 32 33  
Neutral  14 13 20    9 21 13 
Positive 25 23 24  31 38 37 
   Total  88 80 80 108 91 83 27.907   10 .002 
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Means testing was performed to confirm these findings, entering the code 1 for 
positive tone, 2 for neutral or balanced, and 3 for positive tones. Table 4.7 shows that 
there were significant differences between the means for Trump (2.08) and Clinton (1.83) 
regarding tone of Twitter comments that contained images.   
 
Table 4.7 
Means and ANOVA tests for Tones and Images 
   Mean  Std   
Image:    N  Tone  Dev.  F  Sig. 
None  4310  1.94  .858  
Trump    352  2.05  .884  
Clinton   530  1.84  .898  
Both    295  2.26  .752 
Other    532  1.93  .860 
     Total 6019  1.95  .862  12.846  .000 
 
 
Following are specific Twitter comments that were the most retweeted in this 
sample. As indicated below, the comment retweeted most widely was in India, where a 
news article about Clinton linking to Wikileaks was retweeted more than 4,100 times. 
The second most widely-circulated tweet in this entire study was from the U.K., where a 
conservative commentator who is associated with Alex Jones’ InfoWars remarked about 
the FBI probe of Clinton and generated almost 3,000 retweets. 
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Table 4.8 
 
Comments and Sources with the Most Retweets  
 
Nation  # of Retweets  Source    # of  Followers 
US  2,598 on 11-5-16    Fox News host  DA Jeanine Pirro   675,000   
  1,557 on 11-7-16 McKay Coppins,  
The Atlantic journalist  107,000 
879 on 10-30-16 Joe Scarborough MSNBC            1,630,000 
559 on 10-31-16 Fox & Friends     931,331  
521 on 11-5-16 Daniel Dale, Toronto Star journalist  180,000 
 
UK  2,982 on 10-30-16 Paul Joseph Watson, conservative UK radio 
    host and Infowars editor-at-large    665,000 
1,307 on 11-8-16 BBC Breaking News           32,357,000 
865 on 10-31-16 Paul Joseph Watson, journalist   665,000 
627 on 10-31-16 BBC Breaking News           32,357,000 
 
 
Brazil  26 on 11-8-16   Pedro Rafhael, Individual        17,900 
12 on 10-31-16      Carlos Bolsonaro,  
conservative politician    116,000 
 
Russia  2,009 on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870  
1,597 on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870 
1,013 on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870 
742  on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870 
712 on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870 
408 on 11-4-16 RT     2,601,870 
 
India  4,143  on 11-4-16 The Hindustan Times   5,700,000  
154 on 11-7-16 Minhaz Merchant, journalist       135,000  
135 on 11-8-16  Zero Hedge, financial news blog    427,000  
61 on 11-8-16  Sahil Kapur, journalist         70,000  
47 on 11-8-16  RJ Alok, journalist       417,000 
 
China  228 on 11-5-16 CGTN     3,300,000 
179 on 11-7-16 CGTN     3,300,000 
136 on 11-3-16 Kaiser Kuo,  journalist       46,500 
99 on 11-5-16  Xinhua News               10,100,000 
98 on 11-6-16  Xinhua News             10,100,000 
81 on 11-4-16   Clay Shirky, American researcher     365,000  
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Figure 4.7 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in U.S. 
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Figure 4.8 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in U.K. 
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Figure 4.9 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in Brazil 
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Figure 4.10 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in Russia 
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Figure 4.11 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in India 
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Figure 4.12 
 
Most Retweeted Twitter Comments in China 
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Tones of Twitter Comments 
Research Question 2 includes the examination of tones of Twitter comments—
what are the frequencies of those that are either negative, positive or neutral about 
candidates Trump and Clinton, in the six nations. Table 4.9 shows the results, including 
chi-squares and significance levels of the differences in tones between Trump and 
Clinton.  
In the U.S. and in Russia, the tones were significantly more positive for Trump 
(46% and 56%) and significantly more negative for Clinton (60% and 60%). These posts 
were not from “bots” but real individuals and organizations. The tones in these two 
nations stand apart from the other four nations in the study. Only the United Kingdom 
was most frequently negative about Trump on Twitter, about as equally as it was negative 
about Clinton (41% and 42%).  
In the U.K. and in Brazil, the tones on Twitter were largely negative about both 
candidates. In India and China, tones were marginally more positive about each 
candidate. 
Means testing was performed to confirm these findings, using the code 1 for 
positive tone, 2 for neutral or balanced, and 3 for positive tones. Tables 4.10 and 4.11 
show that there were significant differences between the means for Trump (2.08) and 
Clinton (1.83) regarding tone of Twitter comments.  
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Table 4. 
 
Tones of All Twitter Comments and significance of differences between Candidates 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
             Trump  _________ ___________Clinton  ___   2  df p-value 
 
Nation    Negative   Neutral     Positive   Negative        Neutral  Positive  
 
U.S.   **206 (41%)  ** 65 (13%) **229 (46%)   **301 (60%)  ** 86 (17%)  **113 (23%) 60.066  2 .000 
    expected count 253.5       25.5     171                  253.5     75.5             171 
U.K.   **207 (41%) **123 (25%) **170 (34%) **210 (42%)  **181 (36%) **113 (22%) 22.552  2 .000 
    expected count 207.7      151.4     170                  209.3    152.6             142.1    
Brazil          202 (40%)      114 (23%)     188 (37%)     198 (39%)    132 (26%)   176 (35%) 1.749  2 .417 
    expected count 199.6      122.8     181.6                200.4    123.2  182.4   
Russia  **  95 (19%) ** 125 (25%)  **281 (56%) **300 (60%)  **115 (23%) ** 86 (17%) 210.419 2 .000 
    expected count 197.5      120       183.5               197.5    120   183.5 
India   * 156 (31%)  *  132 (26%)   * 213 (43%)  * 160 (32%)  * 170 (34%) * 171 (34%) 9.426  2 .009 
   expected count 158        151       192                 158      151  192 
China       167 (33%)      151 (30%)      183 (37%)     177 (35%)     143 (29%)  180 (36%) .532  2 .766 
    expected count 172.2      147.1      181.7         171.8     146.9  181.3        
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
**p ≤ .000 
*p ≤ .01 
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Table 4.10 
 Means and ANOVA tests for Tones, in Total 
   N Mean Std  Std  Interval 
   Dev. Err. Bounds F  Sig. 
 ____________________________________________________  
     
Trump  3007 2.08 .871 .016 2.05-2.11 124.260 .000 
Clinton 3012 1.83 .835 .015 1.80-1.86 
Total  6019 1.95 .862 .011 1.93-1.98 
 
 
Table 4.11    
Means Tests for Tone in each Nation 
N Mean Std  Std  Interval 
   Dev. Err. Bounds F  Sig. 
US 
    Trump   500 2.05 .933 .042 1.96-2.13 57.165  .000 
    Clinton   500 1.62 .829 .037 1.55-1.70 
    Total 1000 1.84 .907 .029 1.78-1.89 
UK    
   Trump   500 1.93 .866 .016 1.85-2.00  5.201  .023 
   Clinton   504 1.81 .778 .015 1.74-1.88 
   Total  1004 1.87 .825 .011 1.82-1.92 
Brazil    
   Trump   504 1.97 .880 .039 1.90-2.05 .082  .774 
   Clinton   506 1.96 .869 .038 1.88-2.03 
   Total  1010 1.96 .784 .027 1.91-2.02 
Russia 
    Trump   501 2.37 .784 .035 2.30-2.44 265.454 .000 
    Clinton   501 1.57 .768 .034 1.51-1.64 
    Total 1002 1.97 .872 .028 1.92-2.03 
India 
    Trump   501 2.11 .851 .038 2.04-2.19 3.046  .081 
    Clinton   501 2.02 .813 .036 1.95-2.09 
    Total 1002 2.07 .833 .026 2.02-2.12 
China 
    Trump   501 2.03 .836 .037 1.96-2.11  .238  .626 
    Clinton   500 2.01 .846 .038 1.93-2.08 
    Total 1001 2.02 .841 .027 1.97-2.07 
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Sources and Tone in the U.S. and Russia 
Agenda-building studies traditionally involve the roles of journalists and news 
outlets. Although individuals were the source for the largest numbers of Twitter 
comments and tones about these candidates in every country, this study aimed to explore 
the tones propagated by professional news sources in the U.S. and Russia, where 60% of 
the comments were negative about Clinton and 56% were positive about Trump, as 
shown in Table 4.12.  These proportions were significantly more diverse than they were 
in other nations. There have been revelations about the influence of Russian hackers on 
Twitter, but this study examined whether the partisan phenomenon also occurred in 
Twitter comments of official media professionals. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Table 4.12 
 
Tones of Journalists’ and News Outlets’ Twitter Comments  
 
 
Nation  Trump  _____________        _Clinton  ______ 
       Negative   Neutral    Positive  Negative Neutral          Positive 
U.S. 
-journalist      4 (20%)    7 (35%)     9 (45%)  12 (46%)    4 (15%)    26 (39%)  
-news comp  15 (42%)  10 (28%)       11 (30%)      23 (41%)  16 (29%)    17 (30%)  
 
Russia    
-journalist      9 (17%)    3  (6%)          41 (77%)    56 (66%)     17 (19%)    16 (18%)  
-news comp   9 (26%) 12 (34%)   14 (40%)  45 (53%) 28  (34%)   11 (13%)  
 
 
Table 4.12 shows that the journalists and media in the U.S. were more balanced in 
tones on Twitter than the American public at large, but still most frequently negative 
  
77 
 
7
7
 
about Clinton. This is surprising as almost every American mainstream news outlet 
consistently reported Clinton as handily leading in the polls up until election day (e.g., 
“One last look at the polls: Hillary Clinton's lead is holding steady,” Los Angeles Times, 
November 9; “Clinton leads by five points nationally as Trump personality concerns 
persist,” Washington Post, November 6). The American journalist and media tones on 
Twitter reveal that they were largely negative in tone, but not as significantly negative as 
the public-at-large on Twitter. The one notable exception in Table 4.12 is that U.S. news 
outlets (but not journalists) on Twitter were largely negative about Trump (as negative as 
they were about Hillary). This is the only type of source in the U.S. that reflected 
negative tones about Trump on Twitter comments. 
In contrast, journalists and news media companies in Russia were more positive 
about Trump (77%) and more frequently negative about Clinton (66%) than were all 
individual citizens in Russia. These were not bots or trolls but professional news 
producers, some of whom work for conservative American media outlets and some of 
whom (e.g., RT) are official media outlets for the Russian government. In other words, 
the pro-Trump and anti-Clinton tweets in Russia were not all hackers, but also news 
media professionals.          
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
Twitter and other social media have revived the need for agenda-building 
research, as they have totally altered the landscape for traditional mainstream media as 
well as for public diplomacy, information subsidies, policymakers and consumers. 
Denham (2010) said that agenda-building is a constant negotiation between more and 
more sources, and merits further study. Others have indicated that digital tools such as 
Twitter need further study to advance knowledge of information subsidies (Waters, 
Tindall & Morton, 2010) and as an agenda-building tool in elections (Kiousis et al., 2015; 
Woolley, Limperos & Oliver, 2010). This research study was also motivated by the desire 
to add to knowledge about the role of social media on the mainstream agenda, including 
those messages generated across international borders, and the potential effects of social 
media not only on elections but on democracy itself, in cultures around the world. In 
addition, Guo and Vargo (2017) suggested “the investigation of intermedia agenda setting 
between news media in different countries can greatly enrich our understanding of 
international news flow and, ultimately, international relations” (p. 503). In this study of 
6,019 Twitter comments about Trump and Clinton from six nations in the days prior to 
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the 2016 U.S. presidential election, a number of findings expand our knowledge about the 
evolution of agenda-building.  
Individuals Build the Agenda on Twitter 
First, even aside from Russian infiltrators and Wikileaks tweets, and aside from 
the candidates’ own tweets which received unprecedented attention from mainstream 
media, Twitter was a source and a conduit that allowed regular citizens from around the 
world to build the media agenda throughout the election campaign. Comments from 
nonprofessional, everyday Twitter users vastly outnumbered those from journalists, 
political parties, traditional public relations professionals and even the candidates 
themselves. Previous studies (e.g. Lotan et al., 2011) had found that most Twitter users in 
certain nations--roughly 70% of Twitter comments--came from individuals, and this 
study found similar proportions for Twitter users not only in the U.S. and U.K. but in 
nations that had not yet been examined: in Brazil, Russia, India and China. 
The Shorenstein study (Patterson, 2016) found that Trump’s media coverage was 
77% negative, and that Clinton’s coverage was 63% negative. The present study found 
that individuals on Twitter created a social media agenda that was at most 40% negative 
for Trump, and 60% negative for Clinton. The results of the election suggest that Twitter 
was a more accurate reflection of public opinion than other media, even excluding posts 
from those who were not legitimate users. This study revealed specific details about the 
phenomenon that has dominated mainstream news headlines (Calabresi, 2017; Dwoskin 
et al., 2017), those that declared Russia had  influenced the 2016 American presidential 
election, and that they used Twitter to do it. The data in this study confirmed a pattern of 
influence from Russia on Twitter, and also identified sources that were not merely “bots” 
  
80 
 
8
0
 
but actual people. Legitimate citizen sources on Twitter in the U.S. and other nations— 
not just Kremlin-backed hackers and news professionals—propagated certain tones and 
story topics, and they drove the social media agenda during the pre-election period. 
The MIT post-election study (Chou, 2016) identified the most common topics 
among Clinton and Trump Twitter followers were gun rights, racial issues and 
immigration. These topics were virtually nonexistent in the Twitter sample for the present 
study. The agenda set by individuals in the present study focused on the campaign status 
and personal attacks, in all six nations. The conversations were never about policies or 
issues, not even about topics of international interest. This suggests that the current 
sample did not include many who were Twitter followers of Clinton or Trump, such as 
were studied at MIT, and that most Twitter commenters do not directly follow tweets 
from the two candidates. 
Fisher and Brockerhoff  (2008) and Golan and Himelboim (2016)  found that 
global social networking platforms such as Twitter provide countless opportunities for 
direct interactions between governments and the foreign public. Results of this study 
showed that governments per se were not a part of the conversations about the American 
presidential election at all—except those from Russia that covertly infiltrated Twitter not 
only as bots but as legitimate Russian individuals and government-sponsored media.  It 
was clearly an example of government interaction with the foreign public, in ways never 
observed before, and it seems to have been easily implemented. 
Russians Drove the American Media Agenda 
Russian comments in this study came mostly from established accounts of real 
individual people, although U.S. federal authorities are “examining the role companies 
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like Facebook and Twitter had in swaying the 2016 election, and how they may have 
been weaponized” with fake accounts and bots (Kosoff, 2017).  Recent investigations 
reveal that Twitter (and Facebook) were heavily populated by Russian-supported trolls 
who championed Trump and denigrated Clinton, hundreds and thousands of times a day 
(Shane, 2017). While this study lays out specific evidence that confirms this occurred, it 
also provides specific examples of the equally negative tones of legitimate sources, 
including media outlets. In other words, even excluding the Russian bots and trolls, the 
tones were overwhelmingly in favor of Trump and against Clinton, in proportions unlike 
any other nation.  
The comment tones in the U.S. as well as in Russia were equally negative about 
Clinton (60% negative in both the U.S. and Russia), much more than in other countries. 
And only the Twitter users in the U.S. and Russia were predominantly positive about 
Trump. American comments were eerily similar to those in Russia, and further evidence 
that Russians used American pseudonyms and internet addresses, and incited or amplified 
American Twitter users to be wholeheartedly pro-Trump. One social media profile from a 
Russian troll showed an American name with a background that could not be verified 
later by investigative reporters, and whose photo showed him in a Brazilian restaurant, 
and another photo revealing a “Brazilian-style electrical outlet” (Shane, 2017, p. A1). 
Clearly, the Russian propaganda machine used internet protocol addresses in the Russia, 
the U.S. and, as this study reflects, they probably used Brazilian internet protocol 
addresses as well. 
The Twitter sources in Brazil were unique compared to others countries—almost 
entirely comprised of individuals (roughly 85%), more than any other nation. Brazilian 
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media and journalists were virtually absent from Twitter, which was very unusual. Those 
with the most followers were unverified “actresses” and “television producers.” Brazil 
also had the greatest disparity of total comments about Trump during this period 
(324,600) compared to those about Clinton (11,400). Although all the individuals in the  
sample appeared to be legitimate people, such a discrepancy reflects an unnatural or 
artificial presence in the Twitter parameter of Brazil. These legitimate accounts were very 
likely trolls for Trump and may, in fact, reflect Russian operatives at work, as suggested 
by Shane (2017). While some Trump trolls appeared in other nations as well, they were 
far more numerous in Brazil, creating an unusual forum for international Twitter 
discourse about the American candidates. Most news accounts about the Russian 
influence on the campaign do not mention Brazil, but this study suggests there was some 
sort of manipulation of Twitter accounts using internet addresses from several nations 
around the world. 
The changing and evasive nature of verifiable sources on social media—
pseudonyms and trolls--means that their role as “information subsidies” is insidiously 
influential, and may lead to a general distrust of all media. And platforms such as Twitter 
provide a direct and global platform that bypasses the usual scrutiny of news editors and 
reporters. This platform clearly bypasses the usual scrutiny of international diplomats and 
state departments as well. It is now known to be easily infiltrated and manipulated by 
unknown and untraceable groups and individuals, as shown in this study.  
Of course, the skepticism about verifiable news stories is also generated by those 
in power who trade in falsehoods, with or without social media. Politicians and their 
spokespeople were given wide berth by all the media to stretch the truth throughout the 
  
83 
 
8
3
 
2016 election. For example, The New York Times has been widely rebuked by other 
media companies for “very badly” erring in its over-coverage of the Clinton email issue 
(Fallows, 2017, n.p.), which legitimized the topic for all other media. It inspired a post-
election meme: “but her emails!”  While the Times has yet to account for this biased 
coverage of Clinton, this study opens up the possibility that the New York Times’ 
reporters—and other journalists--were scrolling through Twitter feeds and reading the 
scores of RT posts, every time Wikileaks released another batch of old emails leaked 
from the Clinton campaign. Vargo and Guo (2016) recently performed a large-scale 
intermedia agenda-setting analysis for one year, and found that The New York Times and 
other American mainstream media were likely to follow the agenda of online partisan 
media agenda, rather than set the agenda themselves. Vargo and Guo (2016) found that 
“partisan media were successful in predicting which issues were covered by other media” 
(p. 18). While the New York newspaper was not one of the mainstream outlets in this 
particular study, this intermedia phenomenon does not explain why U.S. mainstream 
media in this study were more critical about Trump than media in other nations. As a 
group, the American media outlets on Twitter were equally negative about Trump and 
Clinton, which is not in parallel with partisan media, nor with Russian media. American 
media might have tipped the Twitter tones more in favor of Clinton, had Twitter not been 
overwhelmed by Russian trolls. But the presence of American media tones on Twitter 
were not reflective of the Twitter population as a whole, as they were in Russia.   
In Russia, an exceptional 35 percent of Twitter comments about Clinton came 
from journalists or media companies–a much higher proportion than did such Russian 
comments about Trump, and greater than the other nations’ proportions of media and 
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journalist comments. This provides residual evidence that thousands of individual 
accounts and tweets were deleted, leaving behind an unusually high proportion of tweets 
from news media and journalists. The most retweets in Russia were from RT, formerly 
called Russia Today, the official government-run TV news media outlet. No other nation 
had a single source representing all of the most popular retweets; in this case, the RT 
tweets all centered on the same topic (the RT Julian Assange interview about Clinton 
emails released through Wikileaks) and all on the same day (November 4). RT essentially 
repeatedly tweeted a story that, taken together, was retweeted 6,481 times in a single day, 
far more than any retweet in any nation during this period. Further examination might 
reveal exactly who retweeted the RT Assange story 6,481 times; they were not all in 
Russia, as that number far exceeds the total number of tweets in Russia that day (roughly 
3,000). It is possible that more than one such retweeter was working at the The New York 
Times, which covered the Assange email story so thoroughly.  
In the U.S., the Twitter sources with the most followers were media companies, 
such as The Washington Post and NBC News (the New York Times did not appear in this 
study’s random sample). However, those that were retweeted most frequently were often 
specific journalists—such as Fox News’ Jeanine Pirro and MSNBC’s Joe Scarborough. 
The American sample under study had no tweets directly from Breitbart or InfoWars, 
although eight U.S. individuals tweeted links to those sites. Benkler et al. had found that 
Breitbart was the “center of a distinct right-wing media ecosystem” (2017, n.p.) in their 
automated study of Twitter during the six months prior to the election. Their study 
indicated that Breitbart was most frequently retweeted by others, particularly by 
individuals, but the present study found that Breitbart was not a frequent originator of 
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tweets. It was observed that scores of individuals in the U.S. had screen names such as 
“Sophia4Trump,” “TrumpGo2016,” “ExposeLiberals,” and variations using the word 
“Deplorable.” This indicates that many U.S. Twitter comments about both Trump and 
Clinton came from ardent Trump supporters, if not from Breitbart or Kremlin-backed 
trolls. There were no such pseudonyms that seemed to specifically identify pro-Clinton 
supporters.  
Sources in the U.K. were comprised in similar proportions as the U.S.: news 
media companies had the most followers, such as BBC Breaking News with more than 32 
million followers (the most followers for a single source in this study). But the greatest 
number of retweets were given to comments from specific journalists, particularly for the 
InfoWars contributor and British conservative radio host, Paul Joseph Watson, which 
contained inflammatory negative comments about Clinton.  
A similar pattern emerged for Twitter sources in India: individuals made the most 
frequent comments but media companies dominated in numbers of followers, such as 
NDTV and Times Now. The Hindustan Times ran the single most retweeted comment in 
this entire study (4,143 retweets):  the story about Wikileaks that seemed to originate at 
RT in Russia, one which was retweeted by other major media around the world.  In 
China, there were mostly individuals represented as well, almost all of whom appeared to 
be resident non-Asians who had access to Twitter. One of these individuals, to the 
researcher’s surprise, was the communications scholar Clay Shirky, who appears to live 
in Shanghai. A couple of other Chinese journalists, such as Kaiser Kuo, evidently work 
for western news agencies or access Twitter through a non-Chinese internet server. The 
most-followed and most-retweeted sources in China were media conglomerates, such as 
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Xinhua News and CGTN. These media companies have millions of Twitter followers, 
none of whom are Chinese citizens. The Twitter accounts of these English-language 
media companies appear to serve one purpose only, and that is to disseminate state-
sanctioned news to users in other nations, not their own. 
With the introduction of social media, Vargo and Guo (2016) found that even elite 
American newspapers like The New York Times and Washington Post were no longer in 
control of the news agenda, instead following the leads of online partisan media.  
Research such as this study confirms this and widens our knowledge further, not only 
about content created by journalists and news companies but by increasingly influential 
masses of individual Twitter users, even those in foreign countries.  
Conservative Journalists Helped Build the Twitter Agenda  
It was surprising how minor a role journalists played overall in the Twitter 
discourse, as a source category, particularly in the U.S., where the role of journalism and 
potential media bias was an issue Trump raised often during the campaign. The most 
visible and voluble journalists were those that were very pro-Trump (e.g. Watson in the 
U.K., Wood in Russia) and not in the United States.  
Very few comments in this study—almost none--were contributed by politicians, 
diplomats or other celebrities, and virtually none by organizations, associations, 
educators or institutes. A handful of sources were private companies, some of which 
included promotional comments. For example, betting companies were very popular in 
the U.K., soliciting wagers from Twitter consumers for Trump or Clinton to win the 
election. But for the most part, neither private nor public industry was a large part of the 
Twittersphere in any country during this pre-election period. 
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While many of the individuals had fewer than 5,000 followers, some of them, like 
Eliana Benador in Russia, had as many as 63,000 followers, and she posted as much as 
five or ten times a day, according to this random sample. Further investigation of 
Benador’s website reveals she is a public relations professional consultant based in the 
U.S. and was once employed by the administration of George W. Bush to promote the 
2003 war in Iraq. The “weapons of mass destruction” in Iraq led the U.S. to war, also a 
story that was completely misrepresented and globally legitimized by the New York 
Times (Fallows, 2017). While that event was before the existence of Twitter, evidence of 
this same provider of information subsidies in more than one misleading Times story is 
indicative that Benador has influence with major media and conservative journalists, and 
she now uses it effectively on social media.  In this study, she proved to be an influential 
and powerful presence shaping the social media agenda in Russia, and beyond, in favor 
of Trump. Benador continues to blog about conservative American causes. Her Twitter 
account however, is registered with a server in Russia, indicating either the location of 
her home or her primary client or business. In any event, her agenda was to promote 
Trump heavily, revealing a link between the Trump campaign and information subsidies 
from Russia that are not even secretive or pseudonymous. Benador is not a journalist per 
se, and does not appear in any mainstream news stories about the election, but she clearly 
affected the overall tones on Twitter in Russia, in partisan media, and consequently in 
mainstream media as well.  
Identifying the types of sources for social media confirms that individuals are 
transforming into an enormous aggregate of information subsidies—and, sometimes, 
propaganda—whether they are professionals or not. And while journalists and media 
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companies occupy a smaller proportion of social media comments than individuals do, 
Twitter enables even them to reach far larger audiences than their primary platforms. For 
example, MSNBC-TV’s Morning Joe had an average television viewership of 896,000 in 
2016 (Ziv, 2017), but host Joe Scarborough’s Twitter page had a following of more than 
1.5 million. His Twitter comments (like President Trump’s) are not vetted by professional 
editors and fact-checkers, and, thus, misleading or biased posts from such a mainstream 
television journalist may find traction as having the imprimatur of NBC News, even 
when they do not. Before Twitter, a media source or channel was rarely an individual—
and rarely a journalist who was communicating outside of the official news entity.  
Walter Cronkite did not give regular opinions or interviews in outlets other than the 
evening news desk at CBS. But news companies now encourage their reporters to use 
Twitter and give them some latitude to express personal opinions there (Lawrence et al., 
2013; Lasorsa et al., 2012).   
Conservative journalists reported numerous widely-received and overtly negative 
stories about Hillary Clinton, such as L. Todd Wood in Russia for the Washington Times, 
and Jeanine Pirro at Fox News. These news celebrities have an ability to affect the overall 
media agenda that is more powerful with Twitter than it is with newspapers or television 
alone. This may eventually lead to an environment where a journalist (conservative or 
liberal) no longer needs the media conglomerate to have a national platform and, even an 
international platform, as exhibited by popular online partisan media such as  
Breitbart.com, InfoWars.com and Vox.com. Traditional American news media seemed to 
have given Clinton the leading edge throughout the campaign in poll reports (in spite of 
daily “emails!” stories), but the Twittersphere was championing Trump. Twitter’s 
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intermedia agenda-building appeared frequently on conservative mainstream outlets such 
as Fox News, which also promoted Trump, but also as a direct-to-consumer platform. 
The power of Twitter and various individuals seems to have outperformed the 
mainstream agenda-building influence of politicians, lobbyists, media companies, and 
even the candidates themselves. Trump made egregious errors in public appearances, but 
frequent and colorful Twitter posts distracted the public as well as the mainstream media, 
even when the sources were known to be discreditable and biased.  
The sources on Twitter were varied in power but not without partisan motivations, 
blatant manipulation, and easy crossing of international borders. The fact that a cache of 
old Clinton emails stolen by an unknown Australian man (Julian Assange) and posted on 
an Icelandic website (Wikileaks.com) traveled through Russia with the goal of becoming 
plastered on the front pages of American mainstream news outlets proves that the 
builders of our media agenda are not the policymakers and politicians, as they were in the 
past, but foreign entities who have mastered social media to take advantage of its hold on 
American news consumers. 
Twitter Topics and Tones Depend Not Just on Russians,  
But Also on the Candidate  
Benkler, Faris, Roberts, and Zuckerman (2017) suggested that Trump’s favorite 
issue—immigration—was a prominent topic in the media agenda during the 2016 
campaign. The present study found that only 4% of Twitter comments about Trump 
mentioned this topic (see Table 4.3 on p. 65), and only 2.6% mentioned immigration in 
the Clinton sample. This is notable not only because it contradicts what Benkler and his 
colleagues discovered in mainstream media, but because the Twitter comments in this 
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study came largely from non-American nations, where immigration might be considered 
an important issue. Many residents of these nations have relatives in the U.S., but there 
were not many posts that focused on this topic. Comments from the Trump sample here 
as a whole were focused on the campaign itself (between 64% and 75% in every nation), 
and personal attacks (between 13% and 20%), even in international settings.  
Previous studies showed that media organizations build agendas that gain readers 
through entertaining or engaging stories (Gitlin, 1980; Chang, 1998; Entman, 2008). 
Findings here indicated that criminal investigations of Hillary Clinton served this purpose 
for social media in the 2016 presidential campaign, fulfilling the “vulture mentality” 
described by Ramanathan (2016). Some of this is due to the fact that Clinton was under 
FBI scrutiny between October 28 and November 7 (for the second time since June) 
regarding emails found on her assistant’s computer during an unrelated investigation of 
the assistant’s husband, Anthony Weiner (Vitkovskaya, Granados & Muyskens, 2017). 
During this same period, Wikileaks founder Julian Assange gave an interview that was 
heavily tweeted about by RT and picked up in other nations, in which he implied other 
newly released emails showed that Clinton’s election campaign was heavily funded by 
Middle Easterners who support ISIS terrorist groups. All of these email stories were 
shortly disproved, but they lingered in the Twittersphere. Only three weeks earlier, a 
television program had released audiotape of Trump making sexist comments about 
assaulting women, but that story had long faded from the media agenda by this time, even 
on Twitter. The renewed FBI inquiry and this newest release from Wikileaks were a 
sputtering “October surprise” that nonetheless added fuel to Twitter comments and 
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subsequently to mainstream media that Clinton remained under criminal suspicion and 
that her campaign was in jeopardy.  
Topics such as social issues or constitutional issues were largely absent from the 
entire sample of Twitter comments, in every nation, as were topics relating to the home 
nations of Twitter commenters (e.g., how might the U.S. election affect relations with 
India, or with China). This was surprising, given that the topic of one’s own country 
might be easily on the people’s minds and media agenda of each nation. While overall 
Twitter topics were similarly dispersed in each nation—mostly about the campaign, 
followed by personal attacks—the proportions of these comments varied greatly between 
candidates. For example, nearly 70% of all comments about Trump focused on the 
campaign, polls, and rally events, and fewer than 50% of comments about Clinton fit into 
this category. For Clinton, personal attacks accounted for 39% of the comments, 
compared to only 15% of these for Trump. 
Almost no mention was made in this Twitter sample regarding Donald Trump’s 
comments about assaulting women, or about Trump refusing to disclose his income tax 
returns. If these topics dominated the Twitter discourse earlier in October, they were long 
gone by October 30, the start date of this content analysis. The timing of newsworthy 
disclosures—and the ability of social media to spread the stories quickly and globally, 
getting picked up by mainstream media along the way--affects their impact during the 
last days of an election campaign. And there is great impact for the Twitter release of 
questionable stories that quickly gain attention on other media and supersede any other 
news of substance. The one who tweets last tweets hardest. And that last tweet is most 
likely to be from an everyday individual, not a journalist, or even a candidate. 
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The Twitter comments from individuals focused on campaign rallies and 
Clinton’s emails—around the world--and subsequently so did the mainstream media 
agenda. Largely unaffiliated individuals and false identities determined the topics on 
social media, and journalists and news media outlets enthusiastically followed their lead. 
Cobb and Elder (1972) and Dearing and Rogers (1996) would suggest that individual 
Twitter users had command of the campaign agenda; in this case, social media virtually 
never touched on actual issues of policy or substance.  
Golder (2012) found that female political candidates in India frequently receive 
much less media coverage than male candidates do, and that proved true for Twitter, not 
only in India but in every country under study. Clinton’s sample was always much 
smaller than the Trump sample on Twitter. It was notable that there was a complete 
absence of posts about Clinton’s physical appearance, and also no mentions of Trump’s 
appearance. There were also no tweets that mentioned stereotypical female attributes (or 
lack thereof), feminism, or even the novelty of a woman candidate in the United States. 
Pereira and Biachi (2016) performed a critical study of the two women who ran for 
election as Brazil’s president in 2010. They found that the two candidates were framed by 
news media with stereotypical attributes such as fragility and religiousness, with plenty 
of references to their physical appearances and no mention of their rather extensive 
political experiences. This was not the case in the Twitter comments about Clinton, 
where tweets focused on her being a criminal rather than her femininity or extensive 
political experiences. 
Jamieson (1995) suggested that the mass media are fixated on aspects of the 
private life of a political candidate, and this can be useful for women who run for office 
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because they often are better than men at expressing themselves. Male candidates use 
more war rhetoric and toughness than women do, although Greenwood and Coker (2016) 
found that partisanship superseded gender in terms of choosing such campaign rhetoric. 
Yoon and Lee (2013) found that media treated female candidates equally; their study 
showed that media coverage for Clinton’s 2008 primary race against Barack Obama did 
not reveal gendered stereotypes, although news frames did reflect more negative 
coverage for her. Wagner, Trimble, Sampert and Gerrits (2017) studied multiple elections 
in Canada that had female candidates, over a period of 35 years, and found that 
mainstream news media did not focus on their gender as much as they did the “novelty” 
of the candidates. The frames of 2016 candidate Clinton were not that she was a novelty, 
but that she was considered part of the old and corrupted “establishment.” Anderson 
(2017) suggested that Clinton’s loss in 2016 was due to the fact  that, even today, “every 
woman is the wrong woman” for the office of president (p. 132). Anderson proposed that 
it was Trump’s “newness” and “novelty” as an outsider that overpowered Clinton’s 
strengths. In other words, being a credible presidential candidate was her downfall: “Her 
electability made her unelectable” (p. 133). Her qualifications for electability were 
framed as being a well-connected political insider with decades of experience—qualities 
necessary for a female candidate to have credibility—but that worked against Clinton in a 
“change” campaign. “The problem lies with the culture rather than with the candidates” 
(Anderson, p. 135). 
While this study did not compare content with mainstream media or do time-lapse 
analysis, post-election critiques have accused mainstream media of focusing on topics 
that were not salient to voters, falsely equating particular ethical lapses, and ignoring the 
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views of large American populations, even though they were evident on Twitter. The 
Twitter agenda about Clinton and Trump focused heavily on the horserace and on 
personal attacks, moving into second-level or attribute agenda-building, as described by 
McCombs, Lopez-Escobar et al. (2000) and Kiousis et al. (2006, 2009) about earlier 
political campaigns, before social media. This study expands such research on attribute 
salience to social media, as well as to Twitter’s international audiences. And, more than 
that, it reveals how hundreds of thousands of unidentified sources in platforms such as 
Twitter can drive stories onto the mainstream media agenda and public opinion, around 
the world. 
Oxford Internet Institute researcher Philip Howard suggested that, even without 
counting the bots, Trump was still more popular on social media than Clinton was 
(Kottasova, 2016). This proved true in the present study for social media in the U.S. and 
in Russia, in the ten days prior to the 2016 election, but not true in the U.K., Brazil, India 
and China. The most frequent Twitter comments in the U.K. and in Brazil were negative 
ones about both candidates. The comments in India and in China were marginally more 
positive for both candidates, but otherwise evenly balanced among positive, negative and 
neutral tones for each candidate.  
The negative comments about Clinton in the U.S. and in Russia comprised 60% 
of the totals–the same proportions in each country. Negative comments about Trump did 
not even come close to that number. The proportions of positive tones about Trump were 
smaller but still definitive and significant: 46% of the U.S. comments and 56% of the 
Russian comments were positive for Trump. As mentioned, many of the pro-Trump and 
anti-Clinton comments in Russia were generated by an individual who was subsequently 
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identified as a prominent public relations executive named Eliana Benador. Kiousis and 
Wu (2008) identified that the efforts of such public relations counsel was effective in 
decreasing negative news stories about a nation. In this case, such effort proved effective 
in crossing borders and decreasing negative tones about a political candidate, Donald 
Trump. There have been several studies devoted to the role of Russian influence and 
social media in the 2016 election; the present one provides evidence of the tones of 
comments from each nation, particularly from the most predominant sources: individuals, 
journalists and news media outlets. 
In the Trump sample from both the U.S. and Russia, individuals more frequently 
posted positive comments about him than negative or neutral comments about him. In the 
U.S., the margin for negatives over positives from individuals was small—46% were 
positive and 44% were negative--whereas in Russia individuals posted 53% positive and 
only 20% negative for Trump. This is attributable to the acknowledged infiltration of 
Russian social media by trolls, agents of the Kremlin, but also by Eliana Benador, the 
public relations professional who tweeted 15 positive comments about Trump in the 
sample of 500, more than any other single source, even more than RT. 
As for Clinton comments, individuals from both nations posted overwhelmingly 
negative comments (of which Benador contributed only two). Clinton comments from 
individuals in the U.S. were 64% negative, and 20% positive. The individuals in Russia 
posted similar proportions—56% of them were negative for Clinton and 20% were 
positive. In the U.S., many individuals who slammed Clinton were clearly trolls for 
Trump, such as “TrumpsMyPOTUS” with 4,200 followers, “Trumpster” with 7,000 
followers, “ExposeLiberals” with 98,000 followers, and “Crossbearer” with 91,000 
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followers. They posted comments accusing Clinton of being a pedophile, an ISIS terror 
accomplice, and a Satanist. While some of the stories about the FBI investigation were 
not indicative of actual criminal conduct, the comments posted and news story links were 
framed as “Clinton in trouble again” and “Clinton under suspicion.” The tones for 
Clinton reflect that there were virtually no individuals championing her victory, in any 
country. There were no pseudonyms or any individual accounts who trolled against 
Trump, or in favor of Clinton. 
The disparaging tones about Clinton were not limited to individuals and bots. 
Journalists expressed similar tones, although their numbers were fewer. In the U.S., 
journalists made only 20 tweets about Trump in the sample of 500 (most frequently 
positive), and 26 comments about Clinton (mostly negative).  Journalists in Russia had 
far more presence on Twitter than did American journalists—they tweeted roughly three 
times more frequently during this period. But then, only a few of them were actually 
Russian. Many were American or British correspondents stationed in Moscow, and with a 
pro-Trump agenda all their own. Of the 53 Russian journalists’ tweets about Trump, 77% 
were positive, even more than those in the U.S. There were 89 Russian journalists’ 
comments about Clinton—many more than there were for Trump—but only 18% were 
positive, and 63% were negative about Clinton. So, while the propagandist trolls and bots 
may receive attention as swaying opinion about the American presidential candidates, 
journalists with many followers provided similar influential tones, and with a wider 
reach. 
Media companies were slightly more neutral in the U.S. than media companies in 
Russia, but not altogether neutral. In fact, as stated earlier, media companies were the 
  
97 
 
9
7
 
only American source type that emerged as negative in tone toward Trump. However, 
they were also equally negative in terms of Clinton. None of the source categories from 
the U.S. and Russia–not individuals, not journalists, not media companies–were most 
frequently positive about Clinton. Even though American mainstream media seemed to 
predict a wide victory for Clinton when they published daily polls on their front pages, 
social media comments were clearly leaning in the other direction. Anyone who actually 
paid attention to Twitter would have seen that all sources were astonishingly in favor of 
Trump, not only in Russia but in the U.S. The Twitterspheres about the American 
election were eerily similar in these two nations.  In other countries,  however, the tones 
on Twitter were more distinctive. There were notable disparities in the other nations in 
this Twitter study about agenda-building for Trump and Clinton. 
Twitter is Totally Different from One Nation to the Next 
Shoemaker and Reese (1991) pointed out that the agenda-building process 
requires a crucial step: cultural considerations. This study aimed to assess the different 
considerations in cultures other than the U.S. While Russia was a major focus due to its 
role in efforts to influence the American election, this study examined Twitter in Brazil, 
China, the U.K. and India, nations which have been largely excluded from previous 
communications research about Twitter. Edward Hall (1976), as well as Gudykunst and 
Ting-Toomey (1988)  described distinctions of high context cultures; Hofstede’s (1993)  
dimensions of culture include collectivism and individualism, perceptions of power 
distance among populations, feminine and masculine identities, uncertainty avoidance 
and the orientation of time, short-term and long-term. These and other scholars identified 
collective societies such as Brazil, Russia, China and India as “high-context,” as these 
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cultures rely on implicitness and subtlety in effective communication messages. The use 
of Twitter, if used by legitimate members of these societies and not just by trolls or ex-
patriate populations, introduces new patterns in communication for high-context cultures. 
Members of collective cultures may find a new power or identity in acting individually 
on social media, and experimenting in conversations well outside their usual collective.  
Members of high context cultures also may find that social media contains a context that 
is much more fluid and deceptive, as are the representations of power and authority, 
whether they are fraudulent or not. Exposure to Twitter may encourage such cultures to 
experiment with individuality and assertiveness. But this study shows that Twitter is in 
very different stages of development around the world, where it only partially reflects 
cultural contexts. 
Brazil Has a Huge Twitter Population,  
But Not an Identifiable Agenda 
High-context Brazil has more Twitter users than many other countries (18 
million) but the sources are largely evasive and pseudonymous, and there was clear 
evidence that Russian hackers had infiltrated the population here, as mentioned 
previously. Media and journalists were almost completely absent in the sample from 
Brazil, and scores of individual accounts appeared suspicious, particularly the 49 tweets 
in the Clinton sample of 500 that linked to an NBC TV affiliate in Connecticut. In spite 
of this abnormal pro-Clinton contingent, comment tones were most frequently negative 
for her in Brazil. In addition, the Sysomos program presented thirty times more 
comments about Trump than about Clinton in Brazil, indicating an algorithmic imbalance 
that was not present in other nations. This anomaly probably reflects the interference of 
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Russian influencers, as some of their false “American” Twitter identities seemed to come 
through Brazil, as mentioned earlier (Shane, 2017). This does not account for those 
seemingly automated and exceptional posts in favor of Clinton in Brazil, but it does 
explain why tones about her remained predominantly negative—the huge number of 
Trump posts from unverified and unrecognizable Twitter accounts overwhelmed 
anything positive for Clinton, as well as any comments from legitimate Brazilian media 
or journalists.  It appears from the results of this study that residents and media 
companies in Brazil are not using Twitter in any meaningful way at this time. 
China Twitter is Carefully Geared to Non-Asians,  
and Exceptionally Immune to Hackers 
China proved an exception to the overall atmosphere on Twitter, as may have 
been expected since this particular social media platform is not accessible by average 
citizens but mostly by Chinese news media and journalists and expatriate civilians. Other 
studies about popular and accessible Chinese platforms such as WeChat and Weibo have 
shown that social media are powerful tools for democratic discourse and activism there 
(e.g., Yu & Xu, 2016; Wen, Hao & Han, 2016; Wei & O’Boyle, 2016), but this was not 
evident at all on Twitter. The present study did reveal that the state-controlled media in 
China were careful not to endorse one U.S. presidential candidate over another; they 
maintained primarily neutral tones and minimized stories about inflammatory 
accusations. Twitter comments were divided into thirds for each candidate—almost 
evenly positive, neutral and negative for both Trump and Clinton. However, news media 
outlets in China were different: they were more in Trump’s favor (50% of news media 
posts were positive for him, more than the total China sample). As the media outlets are 
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controlled by the Chinese government, and as most individual users are westerners who 
live in China, this shows that the government sanctioned more favorable Twitter 
coverage for Trump than it did for Clinton, who received only 26% positive comments 
from the media here, compared to 36% positive tweets in China as a whole. Eleven 
percent of the comments in China came from specific journalists, a larger proportion of 
journalists than in other nations. Some of these were American reporters in China, but 
several, such as Sinica.com podcaster Kaiser Kuo in Beijing, are freelance journalists 
who operate outside the bounds of state-controlled media, and seem to have outside 
access to Twitter. Journalists who tweeted in China were 61% positive for Clinton and 
only 29% positive for Trump. This is a sizable disparity from journalists’ Twitter tones in 
other countries, as well as the opposite proportion as those posted by official Chinese 
state media outlets, but it reflects that many journalists in China were reporting different 
tones than those in other nations.  
Different from Chinese news media, journalists on Twitter in China were more 
negative about Trump and more positive about Clinton than their counterparts anywhere 
else in the world. While this may be the result of the unique distinction in control over 
media coverage in China and relatively independent journalists, this imbalance in tone 
may also reflect public opinion and media bias in the one nation that seemed to have had 
no infiltration or manipulation by outside influence. While few westerners would suggest 
that Communist control of Chinese media is a good thing, strict regulation does appear to 
keep out hackers and bots. Government rules for Weibo ban anonymous users, false 
stories, violence, pornography (and political dissent).  The government is proud that such 
control has allowed China’s internet companies to grow without foreign rivals, and also 
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without foreign infiltration (Myers and Wee, 2017). Other, more democratic nations will 
be contending with hackers and insidious propaganda for years to come. Freedom of the 
press comes with a price. 
Twitter Users in the UK Are Engaged in U.S. Politics, and Nationalism 
The only other population in this study who regularly use the target language—
English—is, of course, in the United Kingdom. In fact, the Twitter account for the BBC 
(British Broadcasting Corporation) was the most-followed single source in this study, 
with more than 32 million. This is impressive considering it is the smallest nation 
represented in this study, and its total Twitter parameter is only 14 million. The tones 
from the U.K. were 41% negative for Trump and 42% negative for Clinton, making it the 
only nation that tweeted equivalent negative tone proportions about both American 
candidates. But when examining the Twitter comment tones of news media outlets in the 
U.K., they were far less negative for Trump--only 28% negative about him, whereas 32% 
of news media tweets were positive for him. This imbalance for media source tones may 
be due to popular conservative journalists in the U.K. such as Paul Joseph Watson, who is 
not a media outlet but who frequently posted links to InfoWars and his caustic American 
media compatriot, Alex Jones.  
Clinton tones remained predominantly negative for all U.K. sources, many of 
whom were from individual trolls such as “Israel Bombs Babies,” which posted 26 
negative posts about her in the sample of 500.  This is the only nation that posted many 
tweets about Trump’s potential collusion with Russian interests, as well as about Trump’s 
history of sexual assaults and secretive tax returns. These topics simply did not appear in 
other nations. However, like the U.S., the U.K. also posted many stories about Wikileaks 
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and its inflammatory accusations about Clinton, which overwhelmed any negative 
balance for Trump. The positive and negative proportions of tones were less extreme in 
the U.K. than in other countries, in total;  this may be due to the fact that, as a nation, it 
was not a target of or avenue for Russian bots and Trump trolls. It may also reflect British 
attitudes on the heels of its recent vote to exit the European Union only a few weeks 
earlier. Some posts compared Trump’s successful candidacy to the popular “Brexit” 
movement, and there were a few cautionary posts addressing the down side of 
conservative nationalism.   
India Media are Masters of Twitter 
Guo and Vargo (2017) found that a nation’s political and economic status 
predicted its salience in the world news, and also that, in the digital age, the U.S. was 
becoming less and less the center of media attention. They also found that India was 
rising in media exports, and this study certainly found that media in India had a larger 
share of tweets than they did in other nations—more than 20% of the Twitter comments 
about both candidates came from news media sources. India is the world’s largest 
democracy, and also the world’s largest media industry. Guo and Vargo (2017) and 
Tunstall (2008) asserted that media exports in nations such as India have risen to the top 
of the “world media pecking order” (Tunstall, p. 235), which was confirmed in this study 
by the strong presence of India’s media outlets on the Twitter agenda. Until the 1990s, 
Indian television news had been controlled by the government, so it is a relatively young 
news medium there (Thomas & Kumar, 2004). Its emergence in the international arena is 
enhanced by social media, where the relatively youthful TV news media, as well as the 
well established Indian print news media, show great presence. These Indian media 
  
103 
 
1
0
3
 
sources propagated a relatively more even balance of tone on Twitter between the 
American presidential candidates, but the Indian news media accounts on Twitter were 
still largely positive comments for Trump (40% of the time) and most frequently negative 
for Clinton (in 53% of Indian news media tweets).  Individuals in India were more 
positive about Trump and more negative about Clinton than were the news media tweets 
in India. The high-context culture of India was leaning towards the partisan, 
individualistic tones of low-context Americans. Some of this may be due to the wide use 
of English language in Indian media, a residual of the British Raj. But the slant towards 
Trump may also be reflective of emerging partisanship in India itself. India has a popular 
but controversial Prime Minister (Narendra Modi) from a conservative party who is 
perceived as anti-Muslim, and many draw similarities between this leader and Donald 
Trump (Crunden, 2017). Championing an American candidate who was against 
immigrants and trade imports was not necessarily in India’s best interests, but the other 
qualities in Trump regarding nationalism may have served to confirm for Indians the 
benefits of those values in Modi.   
Twitter is an evolving but increasingly important element of agenda-building in 
media around the world.  Social media provides exponentially more exposure for 
mainstream media as well as for motivated groups and individuals who can easily 
disseminate misinformation and propaganda and feed it to mainstream journalists and 
news outlets. While Twitter may provide a vehicle for dangerous political influence by 
some nations, it also provides a new platform for influence by mainstream news media, 
average citizens, journalists and public relations professionals. This study provides 
foundational information about social media in international settings, for political 
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communication and for 21
st
 century agenda-building, which will continue to grow and 
evolve as does the nature of Twitter. Social media has been hailed for the past decade as a 
pathway to a more democratic public sphere, but growing pains show that it is vulnerable 
and in danger of weakening news credibility. Mainstream media may provide Twitter 
with content and legitimacy, but these news outlets must also contend with the 
ramifications of trustworthiness among consumers and counter the reputation for “fake 
news” on social media.   
The Shorenstein study suggested that journalists were fascinated with Trump 
because their decisions were driven by news values, not by political values (Patterson, 
2016). Journalists and media companies want to feature topics and people that are 
unusual and sensational. Findings of the present study suggest that their agenda may also 
be driven by individuals posting on Twitter, because they and their posts in themselves 
are unusual and sensational. Armed with knowledge such as this study, journalists and 
media companies—as well as government agencies and internet companies--will have 
resources to address the challenges of providing influence to any Twitter user, and to 
create media agendas that have the capacity to threaten the free press and other 
democratic institutions.     
Limitations and Implications 
 There are a number of limitations to this study, including the fact that Twitter has 
shown to be manipulated by individuals and groups who misrepresent their identities, 
particularly about a powerful political topic. While the presence of bots and trolls were 
identified and somewhat accounted for, there may have been many remaining identities 
that were falsified. In addition, the keywords and topic selected for this study were 
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centered on an American event which may have held variable importance to Twitter users 
around the world.  In addition, Twitter users are a self-selecting group and, in this case, 
English language users, and may not be representative of the nations or their media. The 
sample size was also a limitation, as it was a small percentage of Twitter comments, in 
some nations more than in others. The numbers of specific journalists and media outlets 
in the sample were even smaller, roughly 20% of the total, making some of the 
interpretations less than generalizable 
Another challenge of examining Twitter is the “echo chamber,” where consumers 
see a feedback loop in a filtered bubble, with little or no exposure to followers who are 
not like-minded (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008). Gabler (2016) called this phenomenon 
“segmentation,” which allows consumers to find niche media, and no longer are forced to 
find commonality in general media such as “stodgy” broadcast television (n.p.). 
Goldenberg (1984) once said: “With regularized interactions, sources and reporters enter 
a bargaining relationship in which each actor extends efforts to interact with the other” to 
create a news product that is a subjective construction, and defined by the various sources 
(p. 236). Academic studies in agenda-building were founded on the normatively 
appealing mainstream media and traditional policymakers, but agenda-building is 
evolving as new media evolves: the public not only chooses its preferred social media 
outlets but also, now, creates the stories, disseminates them, and sends them to reporters.  
This study revealed that Twitter provided a massive platform for special interests 
to influence and affect the outcome of an American presidential election, from parties 
around the world. While news about Russian infiltration continues to emerge, this study 
provides greater detail and insight into the specific nature of the ethical breaches in 
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agenda-building on Twitter, as well as observations about other international and 
influential Twitter comments regarding Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton in the 2016 
American presidential election. This study confirms that individuals—as well as 
international powers—can quite easily influence public opinion by simply typing very 
short messages on Twitter, the accessible, mobile and global soapbox. 
Future Research 
Communications research about Twitter is still relatively new, yet before we even 
fully understand the platform and its effects, it is already evolving to reflect manipulation 
and questionable ethics, which must be studied and remedied. New applications and news 
media platforms will be continue to be created regularly, and these will further influence 
consumers and news professionals, as Twitter has done.  
Future studies may employ time-lapse analysis to see the direction of agenda-
building between social media and mainstream media during this campaign, and during 
other events of international scope. The agenda-building process involves many factors, 
particularly in various cultures where Twitter is not as commonly used as it is in the U.S. 
Further research may use other social media platforms, particularly WhatsApp and Weibo 
which are used more often by consumers in Asia than Twitter is.  
Research is also recommended to examine behavioral responses to social media, 
such as voting behavior and donating money to a cause, as well as the effects of partisan 
media and “fake news” on social media. In addition, studies will need to ferret out the 
“secret” agendas propagated on social media by special interest groups, politicians, racist 
groups and terrorists: elections are not the only opportunity for Twitter to serve as a 
media agenda builder. In addition, it is notable that the sample sizes here for Clinton 
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comments were all much smaller than those for Trump, due either to the hackers in 
Russia or, as suggested earlier, due to the lack of equal media coverage for female 
politicians. Future studies may include Twitter in performing research on gender and 
political communication. This study also exposed disparities in Twitter characteristics in 
nations such as Brazil, indicating a need for more international studies involving social 
media. While mobile internet access is transforming remote and rural populations in 
nations such as China with Weibo and WhatsApp, there would be benefits to exploring 
the influence of social media on other developing nations, not only in South America but 
also in Africa, among many other places that are gaining new access to social media, and 
also thus to American politics.  Studies such as this one help communications researchers 
and consumers to build greater awareness of the validity of news stories and sources, and 
to nurture new generations of citizens around the world who understand the importance 
and the power of social media. 
Meanwhile, more studies may be needed about  Facebook and Google, companies 
which, like Twitter, are being investigated more intensely after U.S. authorities learned 
that these entities sold advertisements to Russian entities during the campaign 
(Applebaum, 2017), some of which focused less on the American candidates than on 
causing racial unrest and propagating civic strife in the U.S. Russians realized sooner 
than others did that “social media campaigns are a cheap way for an impoverished ex-
superpower to meddle in other countries’ politics (Applebaum, 2017, n.p.). Researchers, 
educators, as well as the companies who create social media platforms, must continue to 
address the challenges of global social media. Our foundational communications theories, 
such as agenda-building, prove their value in supporting research that helps people safely 
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navigate online news stories and trustworthy sources. The technology itself exposes 
people to the ability to communicate with a multitude of cultures they might never 
otherwise encounter. Continued research will enhance our understanding of other 
societies and their means of communicating, which may even provide elements to 
remediate the dynamic technological challenges and vulnerabilities of Twitter.  More 
than ever before, lies and fake news travel around the world “while the truth is still 
pulling on its boots.” As social media expands its reach with 21st century innovations, it 
is the responsibility of researchers, technological experts, and professional news outlets 
to keep its contents credible and culturally aware.  
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